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Nicht-technische Zusammenfassung
Kleine und mittlere Unternehmen profitieren aus mehreren Gru¨nden von einer engen Haus-
bankbeziehung. Es erleichtert den Finanzireungszugang und Hausbanken ko¨nnen sich in ei-
ner angespannten Unternehmenssituation “gegen den Wind lehnen” und das Unternehmen
weiter finanzieren. Eine enge Hausbankbeziehung bietet somit eine Art Liquida¨tsversiche-
rung. Dies ist insbesondere fu¨r Unternehmen mit einem hohen Risiko attraktiv. Allerdings
ist eine solche Bankbeziehung mit ho¨heren Transaktionskosten verbunden. Kostensensi-
tive Unternehmen mit geringem Risiko sind weniger bereit solche Transaktionskosten zu
tragen.
Suchen Unternehmen eine Hausbank entsprechend des eigenen Risikos bzw. der Mo¨glich-
keit einer Unterstu¨tzung im Falle einer Krise? In diesem Papier untersuche ich die Haus-
bankentscheidung von Unternehmensgru¨ndungen in Deutschland. Der deutsche Banken-
markt eignet sich aufgrund des hohen Marktanteils von Sparkassen und Genosssenschafts-
banken hierfu¨r besonders. Sparkassen und Genossenschaftsbanken haben ein Mandat bzw.
eine Mission Statement die regionale Wirtschaft zu fo¨rdern und Unternehmen in einer
Krise zu unterstu¨tzen. Private Banken hingegen haben keine solche Festlegung. In diesem
Papier wird der Einfluss verschiedener Kriterien auf die Wahl der Hausbank untersucht,
beispielsweise die Nachfrage nach einer Liquidita¨tsversicherung, die Kostensensitivita¨t und
das Risiko des Unternehmens zum Gru¨ndungszeitpunkt.
Das KfW/ZEW Gru¨ndungspanel ist eine repra¨sentative Befragung junger Unterneh-
men in Deutschland und beinhaltet Informationen zum Unternehmen und den Gru¨nderper-
sonen. Daru¨ber hinaus wurden Information zur gewa¨hlten Hausbank und der Bedeutung
verschiedener Kriterien bei dieser Entscheidung erhoben. Die Analyse basiert auf nahe
zu 1.900 Unternehmensbeobachtungen der Gru¨ndungskohorten 2009 bis 2011. Alternative
Banken, die dem Unternehmer zu Verfu¨gung standen, wurden u¨ber das ZEW Bankpanel
ermittelt. Die Wahl der Hausbank wurde in zwei Schritten untersucht. Zuna¨chst wrude
mittels eines Logit Model die Wahl des Typs der Hausbank untersucht (Sparkasse oder
Genossenschaftsbank versus Privatbank). In einem zweiten Schritt wurde mit Hilfe eines
Nested Logit Models die Wahl einer der Bank selbst analysiert.
Die Ergbenisse zeigen, dass Unternehmen, fu¨r die eine erwartete Unterstu¨tzung der
Bank im Falle einer Unternehmenskrise eine sehr hohe Bedeutung hat, mit ho¨herer Wahr-
scheinlichkeit eine Sparkasse oder Genossenschaftsbank wa¨hlen. Werden Beziehungen aus
einer perso¨nlichen bzw. privaten Bankbeziehung als wichtig erachtet bleiben diese Un-
ternehmen mit einer ho¨heren Wahrscheinlichkeit ebenfalls bei ihrer Sparkasse oder Ge-
nossenschaftsbank als bei einer Privatbank. Kostensensitive Unternehmen wa¨hlen eher
eine Privatbank. Allerdings gibt es keine Hinweise darauf, dass Unternehmen eine Bank
entsprechend ihres Ausfallrisikos eine Hausbank wa¨hlen. Banken mit einem hohen Markt-
anteil haben eine ho¨here Wahrscheinlichkeit als Hausbank gewa¨hlt zu werden. Die Distanz
zwischen dem Kunden und der Filiale ist aus o¨konomischer Sicht unbedeutend.
Executive Summary
Building up close main-bank relationships can be beneficial to small and medium sized
firms for several reasons. For mature firms, relationship lending eases access to bank
finance and positively affects firm innovation activity. As a further advantage, a relation-
ship bank is able to “lean against the wind” if a firm is in financial distress. Relationship
banking therefore provides an insurance for liquidity and is especially attractive for high
risk firms. But firms face transaction costs in providing information. Cost sensitive firms
with low risk might not want to bear these costs and ask for more transaction oriented
banking. A bank’s ability to offer relationship banking depends on its portfolio charac-
teristics, hierarchy, investment in specialization, and strategy. For banks that have higher
refinancing costs than others, it is hard to invest in specialization to offer the advantages
of relationship banking and simultaneously offer competitive interest rates. Such banks
have incentives to compete in debt repayments. In other words, those banks offer cheap
loans and services to cost sensitive firms with low default risk and which do not demand
liquidity insurance.
Do firms select the main bank relationship according to their risk or preferences for
being helped in difficult times? I empirically test this for newly established German firms.
High market shares of public and cooperative banks make the German banking system
particularly interesting with regard to this question. Both Sparkassen and cooperative
banks have a mission statement and implicit or explicit guarantees, reducing refinancing
costs. But private banks are not restricted to a certain lending or liquidation policy
and have incentives to offer transaction oriented banking, thus attracting low risk firms.
I analyse a firm’s main bank choice related to its demand for liquidity insurance, its
sensitivity to costs, and its ex ante default risk.
The KfW/ZEW Start-up Panel, a representative sample of young firms in Germany,
paints a rich picture of firm and entrepreneurial characteristics. It includes detailed in-
formation on firms’ criteria for choosing a main bank relationship, the selected bank, and
previous private relationships with that bank. I use nearly 1,900 observations on firms es-
tablished between 2009 to 2011. Alternative banks and their characteristics are identified
using the ZEW Bank Panel. I test for risk considerations in a firm’s initial main bank
choice in two steps. In the first step, I employ a logit model to estimate the probability
of choosing a certain bank type. In the second step, I employ a nested logit model to
estimate the probability of choosing a bank out of a set of alternative banks.
I find that firms for which “expected bank support in financial distress” is of the utmost
importance choose a relationship oriented bank. Entrepreneurs who consider their personal
bank relationship to be valuable to their firm are also more likely choose a relationship
oriented bank. However, I do not find that firms select their main bank according to ex
ante risk measured by predicted default probability. Cost sensitive firms are more likely to
choose a private bank. Furthermore, I find that a bank’s local competence is an important
selection factor. Banks with a high regional market share and those that are regionally
concentrated are more likely to be chosen. The distance between firm location and bank
branch is not economically significant.
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Abstract
Do firms select their main bank relationship according to their risk or risk prefer-
ences? Relationship banking is attractive for high risk firms since it improves their
access to finance and provides liquidity insurance. Low risk firms instead may not
want to bear the additional costs. I employ a nested logit model to study the deter-
minants of the main bank relationship decision by newly established German firms. I
find that firms that ask for bank support in case of financial distress are more likely
to choose a relationship-oriented bank, such as a public or cooperative bank. Cost
sensitive firms are more likely to choose a private bank. But I find no evidence that
firms select a bank according to ex ante risk. Transaction oriented banks are not able
to attract low risk firms.
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1 Introduction
Building up close main-bank relationships can be beneficial to small and medium sized
firms for several reasons. For mature firms, relationship lending eases access to bank
finance (Berger and Black, 2011; Elsas and Krahnen, 1998; Petersen and Rajan, 1994;
Cole, 1998) and positively affects firm innovation activity (Herrera and Minetti, 2007).
As a further advantage, a relationship bank is able to “lean against the wind” if a firm
is in financial distress (Petersen and Rajan, 1997). Based on the information gathered
by multiple interactions, a relationship bank is better informed and therefore capable of
evaluating a firm’s going concern value. Such a bank makes more efficient liquidations
keeping financing distressed but viable firms (Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 1994). Relation-
ship banking therefore provides an insurance for liquidity and is especially attractive for
high risk firms. But firms face transaction costs in providing information. Furthermore,
banks have an informational monopoly and bind firms to this relationship, which allows
inter-temporal cost sharing and bank rent seeking. Therefore, cost sensitive firms with
low risk might ask for more transaction oriented banking.
A bank’s ability to offer relationship banking depends on its portfolio characteristics,
investment in specialization, and strategy. Berger and Black (2011) argue that hierarchal
banks are less capable of processing soft-information, such as an entrepreneur’s trust-
worthiness. They show empirically that larger banks are less capable of passing along
soft-information within the hierarchy and are therefore less involved in relationship lend-
ing. Brown et al. (2012) show that larger banks react more strongly to hard-facts, such
as credit ratings, than do small banks. There is a further literature shows that the char-
acteristics of the bank portfolio affect a firm’s probability of experiencing distress and
subsequent market exit (Peek and Rosengren (2005), Fukuda et al. (2009), and Ho¨wer
(2009)) or innovation activity (Ho¨wer et al., 2011). Furthermore, banks need to invest in
specialization in order to offer relationship banking (Boot and Thakor, 2000). For banks
that have higher refinancing costs than others, it is hard to invest in specialization to offer
the advantages of relationship banking and simultaneously offer competitive interest rates.
Matthey (2010) argues that such banks have incentives to compete in debt repayments.
In other words, those banks offer cheap loans and services to cost sensitive firms with low
default risk and which do not demand liquidity insurance.
Do firms select the main bank relationship according to their risk or preferences for
being helped in difficult times? I empirically test this for newly established German firms.
High market shares of Sparkassen and cooperative banks make the German banking system
particularly interesting with regard to this question. Both Sparkassen and cooperative
banks have a mission statement and implicit or explicit guarantees, reducing refinancing
costs. But private banks are not restricted to a certain lending or liquidation policy
and have incentives to offer transaction oriented banking, thus attracting low risk firms.
I analyse a firm’s main bank choice related to its demand for liquidity insurance, its
sensitivity to costs, and its ex ante default risk. For my analyses, I identify the main bank
initially chosen, as well as banks that were also available to the firm. The set of alternatives
varies over firms, depending on the local banking market. I focus on newly established
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firms since there is no previous financial track record or entrepreneurial experience in that
particular business and the bank choice is not influenced by the decision or timing of
switching the main bank.
The KfW/ZEW Start-up Panel, a representative sample of young firms in Germany,
paints a rich picture of firm and entrepreneurial characteristics. It includes detailed in-
formation on firms’ criteria for choosing a main bank relationship, the selected bank, and
previous private relationships with that bank. I use nearly 1,900 observations on firms es-
tablished between 2009 to 2011. Alternative banks and their characteristics are identified
using the ZEW Bank Panel. I test for risk considerations in a firm’s initial main bank
choice in two steps. In the first step, I employ a logit model to estimate the probability
of choosing a certain bank type. In the second step, I employ a nested logit model to
estimate the probability of choosing a bank out of a set of alternative banks.
The empirical analysis suggests that the firm chooses a bank and not the reverse.
Only 13% of all firms were restricted in their choice in terms of a bank’s refusal to offer
an account or grant a loan. I find that firms for which “expected bank support in financial
distress” is of the utmost importance choose a relationship oriented bank. Entrepreneurs
who consider their personal bank relationship to be valuable to their firm are also more
likely choose a relationship oriented bank. However, I do not find that firms select their
main bank according to ex ante risk measured by predicted default probability. Cost
sensitive firms are more likely to choose a private bank. Furthermore, I find that a bank’s
local competence is an important selection factor. Banks with a high regional market share
and those that are regionally concentrated are more likely to be chosen. The distance
between firm location and bank branch is not economically significant.
The present paper is structured as follows. In the following section, I review the
literature on relationship banking and describe the institutional background of the German
banking system. In Section 3, I describe the data set used. In Section 4, I present the
logit model for firm decisions as to the type of main bank. In Section 5, I present a nested
logit model. In this model, a firm chooses a particular bank out of a set of alternatives. In
Section 6, I discuss the results and provide further robustness checks. Section 7 concludes.
2 Relationship vs. Transaction Oriented Banking
The choice of a bank is related to transaction costs and to the bank services offered. But
firms may also take into account that their main financing partners can influence their
decisions, and are able to liquidate the firm. In the first part of this section, I review the
literature on relationship banking. I elaborate characteristics that describe whether a firm
is more likely to demand relationship oriented banking or transaction oriented banking.
In the second part of this section, I describe the German banking system. Institutional
differences within the banking sector help to discriminate between banks that are more
likely to offering relationship oriented banking than to offer transaction oriented banking.
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2.1 Firm Characteristics and the Demand for Relationship Banking
The literature on firm financing and financial intermediation stresses that the probability
a firm’s being liquidated depends on the source of its financing, and that a firm selects its
financing sources according to the firm’s default risk or the risk preferences of its owners.
Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994) argue that bank loans are more expensive than publicly
traded debt. They show that firms with a higher liquidation risk select bank loans over
publicly traded debt, because renegotiation is easier with a single or a few banks than
with anonymous debt holders. Wilner (2000) argues that trade credit partners have a
stake in the firm and are less likely to liquidate a firm in financial distress than are banks.
Petersen and Rajan (1997) and Huyghebaert et al. (2007) find empirical evidence that
credit constrained firms are more likely to use the more expensive trade credit instead of
bank financing. But differences exist even within banking, and there is usually a distinction
made between relationship and transaction oriented banking.
Ongena and Smith (1998) define relationship banking as “the connection between a
bank and a costumer that goes beyond the execution of simple, anonymous, financial
transactions”. It is characterized by “close monitoring, renegotiability, and implicit long-
term contractual agreements” (Berlin and Mester, 1998). A bank gains an informational
advantage over its competitors by privately observing the client’s payment behavior. Banks
further reduce the information asymmetries between themselves and the firm and gain
inside information by observing a firm’s financial and entrepreneurial decisions (Fama,
1985; James, 1987).
A close bank–firm relationship can be beneficial for the firm for several reasons. First,
asymmetric information in credit markets can lead to credit constraints (Stiglitz and Weiss,
1981). Gathering information over time can therefore improve the firm’s access to finance.
Harhoff and Koerting (1998) as well as Angelini et al. (1998) show that the probability
that a firm gets a credit is positively related to the length of the firm–bank relationship.
I therefore expect that firms seeking bank finance choose a relationship orientated bank.
Second, relationship banking offers greater flexibility when renegotiation is needed
(Petersen and Rajan, 1994). Discretion in the decision to liquidation is vital for the
bank as well as for the firm. Banks’ investing in screening and monitoring are better in
evaluating distressed projects. Such a bank makes more efficient liquidation decisions,
than a bank that follows a strict liquidation rule (Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 1994).
From the firm’s perspective, the attempt on the part of a relationship oriented bank
for efficient liquidation can be seen as implicit liquidity insurance. In the case of a liquidity
shock, such a bank puts more effort into the evaluation of a firm’s solvency. That bank will
continue financing if the firm is considered to be solvent and the costs can be recouped by
future transactions. Relationship lending can be seen as a commitment to continue doing
business together through financially tough times (Ongena and Smith, 1998), and such
banks “would lean against the wind” (Petersen and Rajan, 1994). Elsas and Krahnen
(1998) find that main banks in Germany with strong firm relationships do so, and do
continue to lend to customers after a worsening of the client’s credit rating. Also Ho¨wer
(2009) find that financially distressed firms that have close bank relationships have a lower
market exit probability. Especially firms with high default risk have incentives to choose
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a financing partner offering such an implicit liquidity insurance.
Relationship banking is related with higher pecuniary and non-pecuniary costs. Boot
and Thakor (2000) argue that banks need to invest in relationship banking. The screening
and monitoring costs need to be reimbursed by the bank’s clients. In relationship banking,
both the costumer and the bank are willing to make temporary sacrifices in order to obtain
future benefits (Ongena and Smith, 1998).1 Thus, clients are willing to accept higher up-
front interest payments if the relationship promises liquidity insurance or lower repayments
in the future. Non-pecuniary costs arise through interactions between the entrepreneur
and the bank, such as the provision of confidential information and transaction costs for
meetings.
Based on the above literature review regarding relationship banking of mature firms,
I expect the following behavior of newly established firms. Firms with comparably high
default risks or managed by entrepreneurs asking for liquidity insurance are more likely
to select a relationship oriented bank. In contrast, cost-sensitive firms and those with low
default risk are more likely to select a transaction oriented bank.
2.2 The German Banking System and Identification of Relationship
Oriented Banks
In the literature, relationship banking is identified by either using firm–bank relationships
or bank characteristics. Identification based on the characteristics of the firm–bank rela-
tionship use its duration (Elsas and Krahnen, 1998) or its scope (i.e., financing volume
(Degryse and Ongena, 2005)). This however is not useful in the context of this study.
My interest is in testing whether newly established firms with certain characteristics are
more likely to choose a transaction or a relationship oriented bank. Similar to Elyasiani
and Goldberg (2004), I use bank characteristics to distinguish between transaction and
relationship oriented banks.
In this study, I use the differences in ownership and governance within the German
banking system to distinguish between relationship and transaction oriented banks. The
German banking system can be characterised as a “Three Pillar System,” referring to pub-
lic, cooperative, and private banks, all active as universal banks (Engerer and Schrooten,
2004). Sparkassen have a “public mandate” to foster regional development and support
firms as long as is economically reasonable. In Germany, this objective is codified in the
laws governing Sparkassen. Sparkassen are owned by the district or municipality. Local
politicians are represented in the board of supervisors to ensure that the bank fulfils its
mandate. Landesbanken are the central banks of the Sparkassen, but also have their own
business clients. These banks are jointly owned by the regional Sparkassen association
and the federal states. Until 2005, the owners of Sparkassen and Landesbanken provided
an unlimited cover in case of the bank’s financial distress (so-called Gewa¨hrtra¨gerhaftung
1Studies concerning the effect of relationship banking on interest rates analyze the intertemporal behav-
ior and find mixed results. Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994) predict decreasing interest rates and collateral
requirements while the relationship matures (see also Santikian (2011)). In contrast, Greenbaum et al.
(1989); Rajan (1992) predict increasing interest rates since lenders recoup the initially subsidized interest
rates. I am not aware of studies analyzing the differences in interest rates and fees between relationship
oriented and transaction oriented banks for equally risky firms.
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and Anstaltslast). This regulation was removed for competitive reasons. However, the
Sparkassen banking sector still provides implicit guarantees by either direct bail–out or
mergers within the sector, and a bank’s risk from former financial contracts are covered
until 2015.2
Most cooperative banks are organized locally, whereas some cooperative banks are
active nationwide but specialize in certain industries (e.g. the Deutsche Apotheker und
A¨rztebank specialized for pharmacies and medical practitioners). Cooperative banks are
owned by members which can be private persons or firms. A cooperative bank’s aim is
“to promote the acquisition and the business of members” (Engerer, 2006). Hakenes and
Schnabel (2011) show that cooperative banks perform the same functions as Sparkassen.
Members face an additional payment liability in case of bank insolvency, which lowers
the costs of refinancing. They are represented in the board of supervisors to ensure the
fulfilment of the bank’s mission. Sparkassen and especially cooperative banks have a close
branch network. This makes them more capable of collecting soft information than are
private banks.
Private banks have no mission statement similar to those Sparkassen and cooperative
banks, but are shareholder value oriented. It is argued that private banks face higher
refinancing costs, because these are neither protected by (explicit or implicit) guarantees
nor by the owners’ additional liability. As Matthey (2010) point out, “to what extent
the true objective functions differ is subject to debate. But public banks usually have the
mandate to support the economy, which they cannot publicly breach. Accordingly, most
borrowers assume that if they take out a loan from the public bank their firm will not get
liquidated at the first sign of financial difficulties. Independently of the public bank’s true
objective function this perception may suffice to allow private banks to enter the market,
separate the borrower pool, and obtain profits in equilibrium”. In the theoretical model of
Matthey (2010), private banks have incentives for offering more attractive loans to safe
firms by a lending policy that includes the liquidation of any distressed borrower. The
expected returns of safe firms are higher than those of risky firms, and private banks can
offer lower interest rates that overcome their cost disadvantage. Even explicit guaran-
tees of Sparkassen to phase out the mandate do not. Sparkassen and cooperative banks
still describe their business model as being oriented “towards common welfare, based on
economic performance” (DSGV, 2008). A Private bank’s liquidation policy needs to be
credible. This does not rule out intensive firm–bank relationships where private banks
collect confidential information by multiple interactions with the firm. But entrepreneurs
need to believe that renegotiation is much harder with private than with non-private
banks, and self select accordingly.
Another aspect of the German banking system is that some banks have restricted
spatial business areas. The so–called “regional principle” should ensure that Sparkassen
and most cooperative banks have a natural interest in their region’s performance. This
restriction influences the pool of alternative banks from which a firm can choose. I classify
a bank in terms of its spatial business area as being either regionally, supra-regionally, or
2The bail–out of Landesbanken by Sparkassen associations and states in the aftermath of the financial
crisis serves as anecdotic evidence.
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Table 1: Bank business area and market share by bank type (2009)
Bank type Statistic Bank business area
regional super-regional national Total
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Public banks # banks 395 41 3 439
market share 0.42 0.06 0.01 0.49
Cooperative banks # banks 904 233 17 1,154
market share 0.20 0.07 0.01 0.28
Private banks # banks 114 62 32 208
market share < 0.01 0.01 0.22 0.23
Total # banks 1,413 336 52 1,801
market share 0.62 0.13 0.24 1.00
Note: This table presents the number of banks according to their bank type and scope of business area, as well
as the share of German banks that have a main bank relation with a particular bank. Information on the number
of banks active in banking with businesses is provided in the ZEW Banking Panel. Information on firm shares is
estimated based on the Mannheim Enterprise Panel. Banks are classified as follows: portfolio firms spread over
up to ten districts as regional, between eleven to 40 districts as supra-regional, and more than 40 districts as
national.
Source: ZEW Bank Panel and MUP (ZEW) 2012, author’s own calculations.
nationally active. The scope of action of a bank is determined on the basis of the spatial
distribution of its clients. For each bank, I count the number of districts in which its
clients are located. In some cases, banks have only a single client in a district. To avoid
inflating the figures with such cases, I only consider firm–bank relationships if the following
criteria hold: First, at least three clients are located in a given district. Second, the share of
observed firm–bank relationships of a given district to all firm–bank relationships observed
is larger than 0.24%. This criterion is equivalent to a bank with clients equally distributed
among the 412 German districts. Banks with clients in up to ten districts are defined to
be regionally active banks, between eleven and 40 districts, super-regionally active, and
above 40 districts, nationally active.
In Table 1, I present the number of active banks in 2009 according to their ownership
type and the scope of their spatial business area. The table shows that 395 Sparkassen
sector banks were regionally active. These banks served as the main bank for 42% of
all firms active in Germany. Nearly two out of five cooperative banks are active on the
regional level only, serving as the main bank relationship for 20% of all customers.
3 Description of the Data Set
My analysis is based on the KfW/ZEW Start-up Panel. This panel is a representative sam-
ple of newly established firms in Germany. The KfW/ZEW Start-up Panel is a stratified
random sample, drawn from the MUP that has a nearly full coverage of the economically
active firms located in Germany. Firm level data of the MUP is collected by Creditreform,
which is the largest credit rating agency in Germany. The stratification criteria are the
year of establishment, the firm’s industry coding, and KfW support.3 Firms in high-tech
industries and with KfW support are oversampled in order to ensure having sufficiently
3Certain industries are excluded, such as agriculture. KfW is a promotional bank at the federal level
in Germany. KfW provides support not only by promotional loans but also by other subsidies, such as
financial funds for entrepreneurial coaching. A firm is stratified as KfW supported if it received any kind
of support from the KfW.
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many observations to evaluate either group. The KfW/ZEW Start-up Panel is a yearly
survey and started in 2008. The survey is conducted using computer assisted telephone
interviews. The sample screening ensures that only independent businesses, i.e., businesses
that do not belong to a group of companies, are interviewed (see Fryges et al., 2010, for
a more detailed description of the data set).
The KfW/ZEW Start-up Panel contains information on the funding, economic activity
and the managers of newly established firms. The fifth wave of the KfW/ZEW Start-up
Panel, which was conducted in 2012, contains information regarding the firm’s main bank
decision. In addition to the ordinary questionnaire, firms founded in the years 2009 to 2011
were asked the questions presented in Figure 1. In the interviews, 3075 firms classified
their main bank as either Sparkasse, cooperative, private, or non-existent (question (1) of
Figure 1).
Figure 1: Bank choice related part of the KfW/ZEW Start-up Panel questionnaire
1. To which banking group does your Hausbank belong to? Yes
(a) Sparkassen (INT: also Landesbanken) 
(b) Cooperative banks (INT: Sparda-Bank, PSD-Banken) 
(c) Large or private banks (INT: Deutsche Bank, Commerzbank, former
Dresdner Bank, Postbank, HypoVereinsbank, other regional banks, di-
rect banks, affiliates of international banks)

INT: Please do not read aloud the following options:
(d) No house bank/main bank 
(e) Do not know / Refuses to answer 
2. Did you or another member of the management
team participate in a private or business relationship
with your Hausbank before it became the official
Hausbank of your firm?
Yes No
 
3. Which criteria were important to you while
searching for an adequate Hausbank? Please rank the
following criteria on a scale of 1 to 5 with 1 being of utmost
importance and 5 being of no importance.
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Prog: Rotate answers 1 2 3 4 5
(a) Specialized industry expertise of the bank     
(b) Expected support in case of a critical business development     
(c) Supply of specialized financial services, i.e. international trade     
(d) Geographical proximity to the bank     
(e) Favorable market conditions     
4. With which other banks did you have conversations about
house bank relationships? With (other) . . .
Yes No
INT: In case of several members of the board of management, one mem-
ber conversing with the bank will suffice.
(a) Sparkassen  
(b) cooperative banks  
(c) large or private banks  
5. Did one of the banks with which you had these talks
reject running a debit account, a loan or other
business relationships?
Yes No Do not know /
Refuses to answer
  
Note: These questions were part in the fifth wave of the KfW/ZEW start-up Panel conducted as a computer
assisted telephone interview (CATI) in 2012. The query was limited to firms up to the age of three.
In addition to the survey data, the MUP contains, for most of the firms, information
on the bank’s name, local branch, and type of the bank that serves as the firm’s main
bank relationship, as well as for up to five further bank relationships. In Table 2, I show
that for 1862 cases, or 52%, the main bank information provided in the MUP is consistent
with the KfW/ZEW Start-up Panel (Column (1)). Column (2) shows that in 10% of the
cases, the bank type information is inconsistent. The bank information in the MUP is
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missing for 1330 firms (37%).
The data set is complemented by the ZEW Bank Panel. This panel contains infor-
mation about the characteristics of each bank’s portfolio, regarding business clients. The
characteristics are calculated based on the firm–main bank relationships observed in the
MUP. There are two advantages in using the ZEW Bank Panel, compared to the publicly
available data, such as the bank balance sheet data from Bankscope provided by Bureau
van Dijk, which is often used in empirical studies. First, especially for small banks, bal-
ance sheet data is often not available. See, however from Table 1, that regionally active,
typically small, banks have a large market share in terms of main bank relationships.
The ZEW Bank Panel covers any bank having relationships with German firms. Second,
the ZEW Bank Panel allows a more detailed analysis of the characteristics of the banks’
portfolio, such as industry concentration or market shares in local banking markets, than
does the balance sheet data.
Table 2: Sample structure and identification of main-bank relationsships
Year of Statistics KfW/ZEW Start-up Panel bank information is ... Total
foundation consistent with MUP inconsistent with MUP unknown in MUP
(1) (2) (3)
2009 obs. 644 139 312 1,095
% 0.59 0.13 0.28 1.00
2010 obs. 648 106 432 1,186
% 0.55 0.09 0.36 1.00
2011 obs. 570 119 586 1,275
% 0.45 0.09 0.46 1.00
Total obs. 1,862 364 1,330 3,556
% 0.52 0.10 0.37 1.00
Note: This table presents the sample structure and the identification of a firm’s main bank relation. The
KfW/ZEW Start-up Panel provides information on the type of the firm’s main bank relation. The Mannheim
Enterprise Panel (MUP) provides information a firm’s main bank and bank type. The table presents the number
of observations and share of firms for which information from both data sets regarding firms’ main bank type is
either consistent, inconsistent, or missing in the MUP.
Source: KfW/ZEW Start-up Panel and MUP (ZEW) 2012, author’s own calculations.
4 Logit Model Approach
To examine firms’ criteria and characteristics for choosing a main bank relationship I
employ a logit regression model. The model employed has the following specification:
ln[ p(Non-Private Banki=1)1−p(Non-Private Banki=1) ] = α0 +α1 × ex ante risk
+α2 × Criteria
+α3 × Previous personal relation
+α4 × Seeking external finance
+α5 × Signal: No gov. support
+α6 × Export / Born global
+ε
(1)
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4.1 Variable Description
Dependent Variable In this model, “Non-private banki” is an indicator of the bank
type that serves as the main bank relationship for firmi. As a result of the discussion in
Section 2.2 regarding the German banking system, one can infer that private banks are
more transaction oriented whereas non-private banks are more relationship oriented. The
dummy variable is unity if the selected bank is either a Sparkasse, a Landesbank, or a
cooperative bank. In Table 3, I present the distribution of the main bank relationship
by bank type within the sample. Sparkassen have the highest share of main bank rela-
tionships, serving 49% of all newly established firms. Landesbanken only serve a small
fraction, 2%. Nearly one–third of newly established firms have their main relationship
with a cooperative bank, whereas these banks have the closest branch network (44% of
all observed branches are from cooperative banks). The variable “Non-private bank” is
zero for the following banks: Deutsche Bank (6% market share in main bank relationships
with newly established firms), Commerzbank (7%), Postbank (3%), and HypoVereinsbank
(Member of UniCredit ; 2%), as well as other private banks (2%).4 The distribution of
banking groups for start-up firms within the sample is representative for Germany and is
similar to those of established small and medium sized firms.
Table 3: Main-bank relationships of newly established firms
Public banks Cooperative banks Private banks
firm obs 946 559 357
share 51% 30% 19%
Sparkasse Landesbank Cooperative Large banks other
banks pr. banks
firm obs 906 40 559 326 31
share 49% 2% 30% 18% 2%
No. of active banks† 429 10 1,154 4 205
No. of bank branches†‡ 1,946 71 2,516 890 286
Note: This table presents descriptive statistics on the main bank choice as a decision tree. Figures for firm
observation and firm shares are taken from the KfW/ZEW Start-up Panel for consistent observation with the
MUP. Figures for Number of active banks and bank branches are from the ZEW Banking Panel and restricted
to main business bank relations observed by Creditreform.
† Figures presented for the year 2010; ‡ No. of bank branches reflect the count of branches that are identified
by Creditreform and must not reflect branch network definition of a particular bank.
Source: ZEW Bank Panel and MUP (ZEW) 2012, author’s own calculations.
Independent Variables—Ideal data set and proxies used I present the descriptive
statistics of the main explanatory variables in Table 4. The table shows the mean values
within the sample, as well as the mean conditional on the type of the main bank chosen.
In addition, the table shows the expected sign for the logit regression with private banks
as base category.
My main interest is in the role of firm risk in the entrepreneur’s initial main bank
choice. In an ideal setting, I would be able to distinguish between a bank’s supply of
a liquidity insurance and a firm’s demand for such. The firm demand for an insurance
4During the years of observation, Postbank was taken over by Deutsche Bank. Postbank is left as an
option since it still operates under the brand “Postbank.”
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depends on the firm risk and the entrepreneur’s belief that the insurance is valid. Previous
research has shown that firm risk need not correlate with the entrepreneur’s confidence
or risk assessment. A confident entrepreneur might see a low probability of becoming
financially distressed, and hence not asking for liquidity insurance no matter what the
true risk is. Therefore, an ideal set of variables would contain a measure of ex ante default
risk and of the entrepreneur’s subjective risk assessment.
A firm’s credit rating, generally available in the MUP as provided by Creditreform,
would perform as an adequate proxy of firm ex ante risk. However, the Creditreform
rating information is not available for the firm’s initial year (see Brown et al. (2012)).
Therefore, I use a prediction of firm market exit probability as a proxy for ex ante risk.
The KfW/ZEW start-up panel contains a core set of variables for each firm related to its
initial year. The information on market exit is either provided by the survey or by the
MUP. I use a 90 % random subsample of the firms founded in 2005 to 2007, estimating
a probit regression model for firm market exit within three years after its establishment,
on firm and entrepreneurial characteristics. In Table A.1 in the Appendix, I present
the definitions, the descriptive statistics, and the estimated coefficients of the variables
employed. The variable “market exit probability” is an out-of-sample prediction for the
sample firms founded in 2009 to 2011.
In order to test the goodness-of-fit, I use the remaining 10% subsample of firms founded
in 2005 to 2007 with known market exit for an out-of-sample prediction. In Figure A1
in the Appendix, I plot the Receiver Operator Characteristics (ROC) curve. This curve
draws the probability of detecting a true state (sensitivity) against the probability de-
tecting a false state (1 – specificity). The area under the curve provides a measure of
the discrimination. The diagonal line (Area under ROC curve = 0.5) suggests no dis-
crimination whereas 1 would be perfect discrimination. The estimated area under ROC
curve coefficient of 0.73 is considered an acceptable level of discrimination (Hosmer and
Lemeshow, 2000). For a self selection strategy adopted by private banks to be successful,
ex ante high risk firms would need to choose a non-private bank. I therefore expect a
positive sign for ex ante risk and non-private banks.
A sound measure for entrepreneurial confidence and subjective risk assessment is miss-
ing in the data. However, in the interview, entrepreneurs were asked to rank the impor-
tance of the following criteria for selecting their initial main bank, on a five point Likert
scale: “Expected support in case of a critical business development” (Question 3 (b) of Ta-
ble 1). This measures the entrepreneur’s demand for liquidity insurance in difficult times.
It might not be directly related with the entrepreneur’s subjective probability of becoming
financially distressed. Even if an entrepreneur would consider this as an extreme event,
it is severe for firm survival. No matter the reason, firms with a demand for liquidity
insurance should be more likely to choose a relationship oriented bank. I therefore expect
a positive sign in the logit regression. The measure is noisy for at least two reasons. First,
the entrepreneur must be willing to give the bank a stake in the firm. Otherwise the bank
will have no interest in supporting the firm. Second, the entrepreneur needs to expect that
at least some banks would support the firm. The latter reason is not a problem for identi-
fication because if an entrepreneur did not expect support from a single bank, this criteria
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would be of no importance for that entrepreneur. For the interpretation of this variable,
one has to keep in mind that during the telephone interview, entrepreneurs respond to
the question up to three years after the initial bank was selected. Therefore, it cannot
ruled out that the entrepreneurs’ answers were biased by either business developments or
by experience with the bank selected.
The descriptive statistics in Table 4 reveal that bank support is a very important
criterion for over one–third of all firms. It further provides univariate evidence that firms
that expect bank support in difficult times are more likely to choose a non-private bank.
The share of firms for which this criterion is of utmost importance is 39% for Sparkassen
and 38% for cooperative banks, compared to 24% for private banks.
Table 4: Firm characteristics and selected bank type
Q
u
es
ti
o
n
ta
b
le
1 Mean Mean Exp. Sign
conditional on chosen main bank type: Base:
Public Cooperative Private Full Sample Private Bank
1. No. of observations (869) (508) (323) (1,700)
2. Previous bank relation 69% 62% 54% 64% +
3.(a) Criteria: Industry
competence†
9% 11% 9% 10% +/-
3.(b) Criteria: Support in crisis† 39% 38% 24% 36% +
3.(c) Criteria: Specialized fin.
services†
6% 5% 9% 6% -
3.(d) Criteria: Favorable market
conditions†
27% 31% 34% 29% -
3.(e) Criteria: Closeness to bank† 48% 48% 24% 43% +
4. Talks with multiple banks 51% 58% 59% 54% +
5. Bank loan/service denied 13% 14% 12% 13% +/-
Market Exit Prob (3 years) 16% 16% 17% 16% +
Demand for bank finance 57% 61% 32% 53% +
Signal: No Governmental sup-
port
33% 31% 55% 37% -
Demand for equity finance 4% 5% 8% 5% -
Export 11% 11% 14% 12% -
Note: † Criterion was of utmost importance (5 scale likert).
Source: KfW/ZEW Start-up Panel and MUP (ZEW) 2012, author’s own calculations.
Based on the discussion of relationship banking, I employ two further variables, pre-
vious personal bank relationship and seeking bank financing. First, I use the indicator
variable “previous personal bank relations” (Question 2 of Figure 1). Personal relation-
ships are valuable if the firm seeks a close bank relationship and the managers consider the
bank as capable of processing personal information. Previous private bank relationships
cannot reduce information asymmetry between the firm and bank about the new project,
but banks can use the information about the managers personal trustworthiness and li-
ability. This can become especially important if firms are in financially difficult times.
The identification of this variable is the reverse. Given that personal information is of
less value for private banks, such entrepreneurs would need to build a new relationship
anyway. Since relationship-oriented firms are more capable to process this type of infor-
mation, those might be better able to bind those clients. Therefore, I expect a positive
sign of “previous personal bank relation”. Table 4 shows that nearly two third of all firms
use a bank that served as personal main bank relationship of the entrepreneur. 66% of
firms that choice a non-private bank already had previous personal relationships. This
share is smaller within the group choosing a private bank (55%).
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Second, I consider firms seeking bank finance in the initial year. With increasing
debt the financiers’ influence increases. The financiers can decide to liquidate the firm
if necessary. Further, relationship banking might increase access to finance. Following
Brown et al. (2012), I define firms with demand for external finance if the firm reported
difficulties and/or used external finance. Demand for bank finance includes the use of
long-term, short-term debt, and promotional loans, as well as reported difficulties seeking
bank finance.5 I expect the coefficient to be positive for non-private banks. Descriptive
statistics already indicate such a relationship. The share of firms seeking bank finance
is higher for firms that choose a Sparkasse (56%) and cooperative (59%) compared to a
private bank (32%).
I use two variables to identify firms seeking transaction-oriented banks. First, firms
stating “favorable market conditions” as a very important criterion selecting a bank (Ques-
tion 3 (b) of Figure 1) may not be willing to accept higher costs from relationship-oriented
banks. The share of firms for which favorable market conditions are of utmost importance
is higher for private banks (36%) compared to Sparkassen (28%) or cooperative banks
(31%).
Second, firms can signal their low risk status to transaction-oriented banks by for-
going public support. Such is offered by the German federal and state governments to
newly established firms. On their web page the German federal ministry of economics
and technology lists 193 different public programs available for newly established firms.
The executing institutions also provide assistance applying for subsidies to keep firms’
adminstration costs at a low, affordable level. The chance to receive funding is relatively
high. Based on figures of the KfW/ZEW Start-up Panel only 8% of firms seeking public
funding were denied. Not demanding public support then can serve as a signal for low
risk. I expect the sign to be negative. Demand for governmental support is defined as the
use and/or stated difficulties attracting either promotional loans, state guarantees, start-
up grants from the federal employment agency, or other forms of subsidies. The share of
firms not demanding public support is higher for private main banks (55%) compared to
Sparkassen or cooperative banks (36% and 32%).
As further criteria, I control for banks’ “industry competence” and “specialized financial
products”. An entrepreneur might consider that banks with high competence or experi-
ence in the firms business is better able to assess the firms business model. Ho¨wer et al.
(2011) show that firms with relationship to a bank experienced in the firms industry invest
more in R&D. Large, private banks might find it easier organising competence centers for
special fields due to the number of customers. However, especially in the cooperative
banking sector industry specialized banks exist. For this reason there is no expectation
regarding the coefficient’s sign. Depending on their business models firms might also de-
mand specialized financial services, e.g. export financing. Large, private banks are directly
connected internationally. Those banks can offer specialized financial products in-house.
Smaller Sparkassen and cooperative banks instead need to cooperate with their central
institutes. Entrepreneurs might consider that Sparkassen and cooperative banks are less
5Loans from the KfW (on the federal level) and other state promotional banks are mostly granted by
a firms’ main bank, while the promotional bank covers up to 80% of the main bank’s loan default risk.
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competent in that field and expect higher (transaction) costs. Descriptive statistics reveal
that the share of firms for which specialized financial services was of utmost importance
is higher for private (9%) compared to cooperative banks (5%) or Sparkassen (6%). I
therefore expect the coefficient to be negative.
Further, I employ a set of control variables that have a potential influence on main
bank choice. A full list of variable definition and descriptive statistics is provided in Table
A.2 in the Appendix. Next to loans, banks offer a variety of financial services. The share
of firms for which specialized financial products was a very important criterion, as well
as for exporting firms, is higher for private banks. Export is an indicator variable that
takes on the value of one if the firm was able to sell products on international markets. I
also control for firm size at start-up, entrepreneurs’ education, industry experience, and
demand for external equity (e.g. Venture Capital, Business Angels, mezzanine capital).
Firm size is measured as the number of employees at start-up, with an indicator variable
that equals one if the firm was founded by a team. I account for entrepreneurs with a
university degree and those that hold a master craftsman’s diploma. For entrepreneurial
experience, I distinguish between successful entrepreneurs that sold a previous business
or run multiple businesses from unsuccessful ones (restarter). I control for ten industries,
including four high-tech (see Table A.6 in the Appendix for industry classification).
The variables “bank intensity”, “local banking market competition” and regional classi-
fication control for regional aspects the where firm is located. “Bank intensity” is measured
as the number of banks active in the firm’s district divided by the number of active firms
in that district. I measure “local banking market competition” as the number of firms
that switched their main bank relationship within the firm’s district in proportion to the
number of active firms. Further, districts are classified based on the population density
as either metropolises, major cities, hinterland, urban areas, or rural areas, defined by the
federal office for building and regional planing.
4.2 Results of the Logit Model
In Table 5 I present the results of the logit model of the firm’s main bank selection. As
dependent variable I use non-private banks (Sparkassen, Landesbanken, and cooperative
banks) with private banks as the base category. From the discussion on bank types above,
non-private banks are supposed to be more relationship-oriented than private banks. A
positive coefficient therefore suggests that respective firms are more likely to choose a
relationship-oriented bank. Next to the coefficient I present the marginal effects (dydx).
All three specifications presented are based on the sample of consistent bank information
(see Table 2 column (1)).
The first specification is used as the base model. It includes variables on entrepreneurial,
firm, and regional characteristics. In the second specification, I introduce choice criteria.
The third specification additionally covers variables regarding firms’ demand for external
finance. The number of observations drops by a quarter because firms entering the panel
a year after start-up are asked regarding demand for external finance only. The main
explanatory variable coefficients remain stable in all specifications and also for other spec-
ifications were I additionally use observations with missing bank information in the MUP
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Table 5: Main results – Chosen main-bank type (logit model)
Dependent Variable: Base Choice Criteria Financing sources
Non-private Bank Coef. Margin Coef. Margin Coef. Margin
(Base: Private Bank) (S.E.) (S.E.) (S.E.)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Personal prior relation 0.445** 0.059** 0.601*** 0.078***
(0.139) (0.164)
Talks with multiple Banks -0.297* -0.039* -0.328 -0.042
(0.146) (0.172)
Bank loan/service denied 0.405 0.053 0.122 0.016
(0.216) (0.256)
Market Exit Prob (3 years) -2.041 -0.269 -0.878 -0.113
(1.413) (1.789)
Criteria: Industry competence -0.314 -0.041 -0.342 -0.044
(0.254) (0.309)
Criteria: Support in crises 0.596*** 0.079*** 0.584** 0.075**
(0.164) (0.194)
Criteria: Specialized financial
services
-0.698** -0.092** -0.672* -0.087*
(0.265) (0.330)
Criteria: Favorable market condi-
tions
-0.645*** -0.085*** -0.671*** -0.087***
(0.156) (0.183)
Criteria: Short distance to bank 0.929*** 0.122*** 1.129*** 0.146***
(0.153) (0.181)
No. of bank relations 0.114 0.015 0.062 0.008
(0.197) (0.247)
Demand for bank finance 0.813*** 0.105***
(0.191)
No demand gov support -0.374* -0.048*
(0.178)
Demand for external equity -0.429 -0.055
(0.326)
Export -0.029 -0.004
(0.241)
Sales -0.125 -0.018 -0.111 -0.015 -0.019 -0.003
(0.220) (0.228) (0.293)
Proprietorship -0.449** -0.063** -0.583** -0.077** -0.380 -0.049
(0.148) (0.182) (0.227)
Firm size (employees) 0.114** 0.016** 0.121** 0.016** 0.070 0.009
(0.038) (0.038) (0.041)
Management team 0.023 0.003 0.013 0.002 0.129 0.017
(0.154) (0.160) (0.185)
Entrepreneurial record -0.418** -0.059** -0.427* -0.056* -0.334 -0.043
(0.159) (0.174) (0.189)
University degree -0.068 -0.010 -0.040 -0.005 -0.080 -0.010
(0.167) (0.173) (0.200)
Master craftsman 0.289 0.041 0.216 0.028 0.193 0.025
(0.200) (0.209) (0.252)
Metropolises -1.190*** -0.168*** -1.021*** -0.134*** -0.746* -0.096*
(0.235) (0.244) (0.298)
Major city -0.410* -0.058* -0.344 -0.045 -0.351 -0.045
(0.175) (0.181) (0.209)
Urban area 0.072 0.010 0.121 0.016 -0.108 -0.014
(0.248) (0.264) (0.302)
Rural area -0.636** -0.090** -0.588** -0.077** -0.603* -0.078*
(0.211) (0.222) (0.267)
Bank intensity (district) 0.225 0.032 0.287 0.038 0.410 0.053
(0.287) (0.300) (0.361)
Banking competition (district) -46.012 -6.494 -38.152 -5.024 -16.159 -2.086
(24.574) (25.403) (30.489)
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Constant 1.646*** 1.370** 0.719
(0.374) (0.524) (0.649)
Observations 1,700 1,700 1,273
LR Chi2 133 233 235
log likelihood -760.18 -710.00 -518.63
Note: In this table I present the results after a logit regression for observations with consistent bank type information in the
KfW/ZEW Start-up Panel and Mannheim Enterprise Panel. I use “Non-private bank” as the dependent variable in all specifica-
tions. This indicator variable is one if the selected main bank is non-private and zero otherwise. The regressions are based on
three samples: “Base” includes entrepreneurial and regional characteristics. “Criteria” additionally includes variables regarding
selection criteria. Sample sice reduces for “Financing sources” since demand for finance and exports for the initial year is asked if
the firm enters the Panel in its second year only. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. *,**, and *** denote significance
level on the 10, 5, and 1% levels, respectively.
Source: ZEW Bank Panel, KfW/ZEW Start-up Panel, and MUP (ZEW) 2012, author’s own calculations.
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(see Table 2 column (3)).
Variables indicating relationship orientation I first consider the variables indicat-
ing relationship oriented firms. As discussed above, private banks do not have a mission
statement or mandate and entrepreneurs might anticipate renegotiations in episodes of
distress to be much tougher with private compared to non-private banks. Consistent with
expectations, I find that entrepreneurs for whom “expected support in case of a critical
business development” was of utmost important criteria while searching the main bank
relationship are more likely to choose a non-private bank. Those entrepreneurs have a 8%
higher probability of choosing a Sparkasse or cooperative bank. A successful self selection
strategy, offering low cost transaction oriented banking as discussed by Matthey (2010),
would require attracting low default risk firms. The results of my empirical model do
not confirm such a pattern. The effect of the variable “predicted default probability” of
choosing a non-private bank is not statistically significantly different from zero.
There are at least two explanations for this. First, an entrepreneur’s demand for
liquidity insurance need not depend on an objective risk measure. An entrepreneur might
also want to be insured against an event that is unlikely but existential for the firm. Second,
an entrepreneur’s own beliefs regarding the probability of distress might not correlate
with the predicted market exit probability. As an attempt to control for entrepreneurs’
(over)confidence and expectations, I employed further specifications including indicator
variables “implementing business ideas”, and “expected higher salary” as motives for start-
ups, as well as “expected sales decline”. None of these three variables are significant.
For expected sales decline, this might be the case because entrepreneurs build up their
business in the first years. In the sample, only a small fraction of firms’ expected sales
decline from the initial year to the second. Both motivations might be related to higher
an entrepreneurial confidence higher than for those that start business as a way out of
(expected) unemployment. However, the introduction of these variables do not change the
results for the main explanatory variables.
Although private banks might not attract low risk clients to a larger extent than
non-private banks, a self selection strategy by private banks could still be fruitful. Bank
clients do not necessarily demand bank financing. The average risk in private bank’s
loan portfolio could be lower if only low risk firms demand bank financing or if private
banks employ stricter rules. I find that firms with “demand for bank finance” (used or
reported difficulties with bank finance) have a 10% higher probability choosing a non-
private bank. This might be the case because firms think that non-private banks are
more likely to grant loans. Other empirical studies have shown that firms seeking bank
finance face more difficulties if their main bank is a private bank (Brown et al., 2012),
as well as having a more relaxed access to bank financing due to relationship banking
(Elsas and Krahnen, 1998). When a firm uses bank financing, the bank’s stake in the firm
increases. I used two interaction terms to control for a joint effect of “demand for bank
finance” and “predicted default probability”, as well as “demand for bank finance” and the
criterion “expected support in case of difficult business development”. Neither of these two
interaction terms is significant (not reported in the table). This could be the case because
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the variable “demand for bank finance’ ’ is restricted to the firm’s initial year. Fryges et al.
(2012) show that the fraction of firms using external finance increases with firm age. 70%
of all five year old firms used external financing at least once, with bank finance as the
most important source of external finance. Firms that anticipate future demand for bank
finance might consider support in financial distress as important. This however can hardly
be observed in the initial year.
I find that entrepreneurs who had previous personal or business related relationships
with the firm’s main bank have a nearly 10% higher probability of selecting a non-private
bank. If entrepreneurs consider personal relationships to be meaningless, they would
choose a bank for other reasons and the coefficient would have been insignificant. An en-
trepreneur could also stay with their personal prior bank relationship just for convenience.
This, however, should not be related to bank type, and the coefficient should again be
insignificant. I therefore infer that entrepreneurs’ evaluations of personal relationships and
their being valuable for a firm main bank relationship, differ across bank types. An en-
trepreneur with a previous personal bank relationship to a Sparkasse or cooperative bank
might expect that heir bank is capable of processing personal information also for the new
firm. A Sparkasse or cooperative bank is therefore more capable of binding those customers
that seek to build a close firm–bank relationship. An entrepreneur with a private bank
as their previous personal relationship might consider this personal information as less
valuable for a new firm–bank relationship. Such an entrepreneur would need to build up
a firm–bank relationship without personal information anyway. Compared to Sparkassen
and cooperative banks, private banks are therefore less able to bind such entrepreneurs.
In these considerations, I assume that the choice of a personal main bank relationship was
not influenced by a potential future start-up. I also control for entrepreneurial experience
to rule out the described effect’s not being influenced by previous firm–bank relations.
Variables indicating a transaction orientation The variables indicating transaction
oriented firms also have expected signs. Firms for which “favorable market conditions”
are of utmost importance are more likely to choose a private bank. The coefficient is
statistically significant and the marginal effect suggests that cost sensitive firms are nearly
8% less likely to choose a non-private bank. The results indicate that those entrepreneurs
consider that non-private banks offer services and loans at higher costs, and so choose
a private bank. The distinction between relationship and transaction oriented banks by
their type can serve as an explanation. Relationship-oriented banks need to invest in
specialization (Boot and Thakor, 2000). Entrepreneurs might infer that this investment
comes with higher costs. For entrepreneurs, comparing costs for bank services can become
very difficult due to cross selling and interest rate differences. Even if cost differences
did not exist, would be sufficient that entrepreneurs expect them to exist. In addition,
entrepreneurs take into consideration the higher transaction costs related to relationship
oriented banks that are due to the higher frequency of meetings and the need to provide in-
formation. Firms that are cost sensitive do not consider relationship lending as important
use a private bank.
I find a weak negative significant effect of firms’ foregoing governmental support on
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their choice of a non-private bank. As described in subsection 4.1, the cost of applying for
governmental support is affordable and the chances of receiving it are quite high. So why
do firms “leave money on the table” and why are those firms more likely to end up with
a private bank? Public subsidies are intended to improve the situations of high risk firms.
Low risk or good performing firms should not be subsidized. I find that firms that did
not apply for subsidies in their initial year have a nearly 5% lower probability of using a
non-private bank. Firms approaching a private bank could therefore use “not demanding
subsidies” as a signal to indicate their low level of risk.
Results for the control variables Firms seeking specialized financial products, e.g.,
export financing or warranty guarantees, are more likely to choose a private bank. The
majority of firms that choose a private bank have a relationship with one of the large banks.
These banks have better and more direct international connections. In general, Sparkassen
and cooperative banks also offer all types of bank services. However, specialized services
are provided by their central banks. Local Sparkassen and cooperative banks therefore
might be less experienced and the transaction costs might increase, as a further institution
is involved. Private banks instead have in-house competence center for specialized financial
services.
Entrepreneurial and firm characteristics seem not to play a major role in the choice
of the main bank. Larger firms, in terms of the number of employees at the start of
their business, have a higher probability of choosing a non-private bank, whereas firms
in the legal form of a limited liability company are more likely to use a private bank.
Entrepreneurs with previous entrepreneurial experience are also more likely to choose a
private bank. But the findings for these three variables are not robust and vanish as soon
as I introduce variables regarding demand for external finance.
There are two interesting effects regarding regional characteristics. First, firms in
regions classified as metropolitan areas or major cities are less likely to choose a non-
private bank than are firms located in urban areas. Second, and even more interesting,
firms located in rural areas are less likely to choose a non-private bank than are firms in
urban areas. This is surprising, because it is often argued that Sparkassen and cooperative
banks are dominant in rural areas. The descriptive statistics of the distance by bank type
and regional type also reveal that Sparkassen and cooperative banks are located closer to
firms than are private banks. The mean distance of the closest Sparkasse in rural areas is
2.2 km, of cooperative banks 2.3 km, and of private banks 12 km.6 In rural areas, those
branches of Sparkassen and cooperative banks are typically small and provide services
for private households. Firms seeking bank financing or with a demand for specialized
services might be asked to approach the bank’s headquarter or a better suited branch.
Even if local branch managers might be in close contact with these units and are asked
about the entrepreneur’s reliability, the entrepreneur would have to face travel costs. Due
to these transaction costs, entrepreneurs in rural areas might be more likely to choose a
private bank than are entrepreneurs in urban areas.
6The direct distance presented seems quite close for rural areas. But note that firms are most likely to
choose a location close to any existing infrastructure.
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5 Nested Logit Model Approach
The empirical model presented above is imprecise in that a firm chooses a bank and not
just a bank type. Now I use a model that allows each firm to choose a main bank from
a set of alternative banks. This version of a nested logit model (McFadden, 1978) is well
suited to deal reasonably flexible with the size of firm observations, bank alternatives, and
a large set of observed variables describing firms’ choice. Each firm i chooses a bank k out
of a set of alternatives from which to choose. The individuals are firms established in the
year of observation. The alternatives from which to choose are the universal banks active
in business financing. Each bank belongs to a single banking group j (either non–private
or private).
The firm’s utility obtained from choosing a bank k out of a banking group j can be
expressed as
Ujk = Vjk + εjk (2)
with k = 1, 2, ...,Kj , j = 1, 2, ..., J .
The nested logit model arises when the error terms εjk have the generalized extreme
value distribution with joint cumulative distribution
G(Y ) =
J∑
j=1
(
Kj∑
k=1
Y
1/ρj
jk )
ρj (3)
where the scale or dissimilarity parameter ρj is inversely related to the correlation between
εjk and εjl. The parameter ρj can be interpreted as the degree of independence of the error
terms among alternatives within a nest. The larger the ρ, the greater the independence
and the less the correlation between the error terms. The outcome variable Yjk either
takes the value unity if the bank alternative is chosen as the main bank relationship, or
zero otherwise. The parameter Vjk from Equation 2 can be evaluated as
Vjk = z
′
jα+ x
′
jkβj (4)
where zj is a vector of variables varying over firms (individual-specific) and xjk is a vector
of variables varying over banks or both firms and banks (individual-alternative specific).
The probability of the nested logit model with generalized extreme value distribution can
be expressed as
pjk =
exp(zjα+ ρjIj)∑J
m=1 exp(z
′
mα+ ρmIm)
×
exp(
x′jkβj
ρj
)∑Kj
l=1 exp(
x′jlβj
ρj
)
(5)
where
Ij = ln(
Kj∑
l=1
exp(
x′jlβj
ρj
)) (6)
is the inclusive value. The nested logit model can be decomposed into two logits (pjk =
pj×pk|j). That is the probability that firm i chooses the banking group j (the first part of
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Figure 2: Decision tree — Main bank choice
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Equation 5, that is similar to the logit model presented above) times the probability that
the firm chooses bank k conditional on choosing bank group j (second part of equation 5).
The inclusive value Ij serves as a convenient statistical test of whether the two decisions
should be nested. If the coefficient of the inclusive value is zero, there is no nesting of
the decisions and Equation 5 reduces to the unconditional probability of choosing bank k
times the probability of choosing the banking group.
5.1 Sampling the Set of Alternatives
The definition of the decision tree and the set of alternatives is crucial for this kind of
analysis. First, I test for the optimal number of nests. As mentioned in Section 2.2 univer-
sal banks active in business finance are organized in three banking groups, but Sparkassen
and cooperative banks have similar business concepts (Engerer, 2006; Hakenes and Schn-
abel, 2011). I employ a Hausman test of the independence of irrelevant alternatives after
a conditional logit model for the choice of bank type, with alternative varying variables.
The test results suggest pooling Sparkassen, Landesbanken, and cooperative banks in a
single nest.
In Figure 2, I present the tree structure used. In the first layer, the firm chooses one
of the nests, either non-private (Sparkassen, Landesbanken, and cooperative banks) or
private banks. In the second layer, the firm selects a bank from among the alternatives in
the chosen nest.
For technical and practical reasons, I need to reduce the set of alternatives from which
each firm can choose. The likelihood function requires that there is an observation for
each firm and alternative. Technically, the number of parameters getting estimated for
each variable added is multiplied by the number of alternatives. Practically, firms are not
able to choose any bank active in Germany because some have constrained geographical
business areas. In general, those banks are allowed to serve clients within their business
area only. This policy is not that strict in practice and one observes relationships with
firms especially in neighboring regions. However, it is unlikely that a Sparkasse in southern
Germany would actively attracts firms in northern Germany. Because there are no clearly
defined local banking markets in Germany, I use three strategies to sample banks into a
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set of alternatives from which a particular firm can choose.
Sampling based on bank branch network In the first sampling strategy, I assign
banks to a firm’s choice set if the bank operates a branch close to the firm’s location.
Each set of alternatives consists of eleven banks. It contains the branch with the closest
distance of a Landesbank and each large bank (Deutsche Bank, Commerzbank, Postbank,
and UniCredit). The firm can further choose from among two Sparkassen, two cooperative
banks, and two private banks, that have the branches closest to the firm’s location. If the
chosen main bank relationship does not belong to the sampled set, a randomly selected
bank of the same type gets replaced.
Sampling based on 25 a km radius Within the sample, the 90th percentile firm has
its main relationship with a bank branch located 25 kilometers away from the firm. In
the second sampling strategy, I therefore assign a bank to a firm’s choice set if the bank
operates a branch within 25 kilometers of the location of the firm. If a bank operates
several branches within that distance, I use the information of the closest branch. A
sampled bank branch gets replaced if the chosen bank branch is from the same bank. The
selected main bank is added if it does not operate a branch within the 25 km radius. The
number of alternatives varies over firms according to local bank intensity.
Sampling based on bank client structure Both of these sampling strategies are
based on bank branch networks. Although most firms choose a bank from among those
with a branch close to the firm, this does not fully reflect the firm’s options. Banks that
are active nationwide but operate only a few branches are less likely to be sampled into
a firm’s set of alternatives. Those banks might be specialized in the firm’s industry and
therefore be potentially attractive as a financing partner.
The third strategy is therefore based on the bank’s client structure. Basically, a bank
is sampled if it has clients in the firm’s region. There is a trade-off between false sampling
and not sampling. False sampling might accrue, because a bank’s client moved to another
region but kept its relationship. But, a nationwide bank might not be sampled because it
is small and does not yet have sufficient number of customers in the region yet. For sam-
pling, I use the classification of nationally, supra-regionally, and regionally active banks,
introduced in Section 2.2 (see also Table 1). First, the firm can choose any bank that is
nationally active. Second, a firm can choose a supra-regionally active bank if that bank
serves clients in the firm’s regional planning area. Third, a firm can choose a regionally
active bank if that bank serves clients in the firm’s district.
The number of alternatives varies, over firms, from 57 to 195, according to local bank
intensity. The number of alternatives and parameters is still high. McFadden (1973)
shows that using a random subsample of alternatives one can obtain efficient and consistent
estimates of multinomial logit models with alternative varying variables. In the regression,
I use a random sample of one–third of the bank alternatives per firm. The number of
alternatives per firm varies between 19 and 65. Again, if the chosen main bank relationship
does not belong to the sampled set, a randomly selected bank of the same type gets
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replaced.
5.2 Empirical Equation and Data Used
Since bank level information is required, I use the sample of observations with consistent
bank type information in both the KfW/ZEW Start-up Panel and the MUP (column (1)
in Table 2). In order to test for the hypothesis by taking alternative banks into account,
I estimate the following specification of a nested logit model:
Main Bank (0;1) = ρ Dissimilarity parameter (4.7)
+ α1 ex ante risk
 indiv
id
u
a
l
sp
ec
ifi
c
B
a
se
:
P
ri
v
a
te
b
a
n
k
+ α2 Criteria
+ α3 Previous personal relation
+ α4 Seeking external finance
+ α5 Signal: No gov. support
+ α6 Export / Born global
+ β1 Market share

a
lt
er
n
a
ti
v
e
v
a
ry
in
g
ch
o
se
n
m
a
in
b
a
n
k
+ β2 Bank size
+ β3 Bank industry and spatial concentration
+ β4 Distance (firm - bank branch)
Dependent Variable The indicator variable “main bank” serves as the dependent vari-
able. The variable is unity if the bank is selected as the main bank relationship and zero
otherwise. Explanatory variables are grouped into either firm specific variables α or alter-
native varying variables β.
Data for the bank type nest (α) I use the variable “non-private bank” for identifica-
tion of the first layer. This indicator variable is unity for non-private banks and zero for
private banks. The vector of variables zj to estimate α consists of the same set of indi-
vidual specific variables used in the logit regression model above. In addition, I estimate
ρ as the dissimilarity parameter that indicates the correlation of errors within the nest.
Data for individual banks (βj) The vector x
′
jk includes a set of variables varying over
firms and alternatives. As alternative variables I employ bank portfolio characteristics
using the ZEW Bank-Panel calculated based on firm–bank relationships observed in the
MUP. Since loan volume is missing from the MUP, all characteristics are based on firm–
main bank relationships of nearly all firms in Germany. Weighting by the firm’s labor
force reflects the fact that, in general, larger firms demand higher loan volumes and more
intensive financial services. I excluded observations of large firms with more than 50,000
employees for the calculation of this measure. Even after the data cleaning process, e.g.,
controlling for sales figures in the employment data field or double counting, there are
potential errors. The effect of this error on bank characteristics increases with the number
of employees. I tested 10,000 and 40,000 employees as alternative thresholds, without
severe effects on the results.
The descriptive statistics on these variables are shown in Table 6. Note that these
statistics are for banks that serve as the main bank relationships of the observed firms.
The interpretation of the table is as follows. Consider the figures regarding the bank
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market share in the firm’s district for non-private banks in the first row of Table 6. The
mean market share in the firm’s district is 27% for Sparkassen, 7% for cooperative, and
13% for private banks. The market share of banks serving as a main bank relationship in
the full sample is 18%. The values of the bank portfolio characteristics are asymmetrically
distributed among the three banking groups (see Table A.3 in the Appendix).
Table 6: Characteristics of chosen main banks
Mean Mean Definition Exp.
given chosen main bank is: Full Sign
Public Coop. Private Sample
No of observations (869) (508) (323) (1,700)
Bank size (division) 60 16 101 55 =
∑Bank
b=1 Firmi,b×Empi
1,000
Bank size (total) 60 16 3,014 608 =
∑Bank
b=1 Firmi,b×Empi
1,000
Bank market share in dis-
trict
0.27 0.07 0.13 0.18 =
∑Bank
b=1 Firmi,d,b×Empi∑District
d=1
Firmi,d×Empi
+
Bank regional concentra-
tion
0.63 0.57 0.03 0.50 =
∑Bank
b=1 (
Firmi,d,b×Empi
Banksizeb
)2 +
Bank industry specializa-
tion
0.03 0.04 0.03 0.04 =
∑Bank
b=1 Firmi,ind,b×Empi
Banksizeb
+
Distance to bank branch 11 17 45 19 Direct distance between firm loca-
tion and bank branch location in
km.
-
Distance to Bank head-
quarter
16 24 257 64 Direct distance between firm loca-
tion and bank headquarter loca-
tion in km.
-
Definition of indicators: i = firm; b = bank; d = district; ind = industry
Source: ZEW Bank Panel, KfW/ZEW Start-up Panel, and MUP (ZEW) 2012, author’s own calculations.
In the empirical banking literature, bank size is often used as a proxy for a bank’s
ability to process soft information (e.g. Stein, 2002; Berger and Black, 2011). Bank size is
usually measured by the bank’s total assets. In the publicly available data bases for bank
balance sheet information, such as Bankscope, the total assets are missing for a large share
of the banks. This would reduce the sample size significantly. Therefore, I measure “bank
size” as the total labor force of the firms for which the bank serves as the main bank.
The Spearman rank correlation between the total assets reported in bank scope and bank
size provided in the ZEW Bank panel for the year 2009 is 0.80, and significant at the one
percent level. I incorporate a squared term that controls for a potential non-linear effect
of bank size on the firm’s main bank choice. Large banks are mostly organized in regional
divisions. I calculated the bank size of large banks according to their regional reporting
required by German banking supervisory authorities. These regions correspond in general
to the states (Bundesla¨nder). Cooperative banks are the smallest banks, followed by
Sparkassen and Landesbanken. Although large banks are split regionally, those are much
bigger than the banks from the other groups.
I use the variable “bank market share in district” to control for a bank’s engagement
in the firm’s region. I measure bank market share as the total labor force of the firms
for which the bank serves as the main bank and that are located in the entrepreneur’s
district in proportion to the total number of labor employed in the entrepreneur’s district.
I expect a positive correlation of bank market share and firm’s main bank choice.
The variable “banking market concentration” provide information about the regional
5 NESTED LOGIT MODEL APPROACH 23
concentration within a bank’s portfolio. It is measured in the same way as the Herfindahl
Index: taking the sum of squared district shares within the bank portfolio. District shares
are calculated as the total labor force of the firms located in a particular district for which
the bank serves as a main bank, divided by the “bank size”. The variable “bank industry
expertise” is related to the industry of each firm. I calculate this variable as the total
labor force of the firms with the same industry code as the observed firm for which the
bank serves as a main bank, divided by “bank size”.
Since entrepreneurs also might consider traveling costs when choosing a main bank
relationship, I incorporate the variable “distance to branch/headquarter”. I expect a neg-
ative sign for distance. I use the STATA program “geodist” to calculate the distance as a
direct line between the firm and the bank branch/headquarter. The geocodes are imported
from google maps and based on the postal codes and city for the bank branches and the
exact addresses for the firms and bank headquarters.
5.3 Results of the Nested Logit Model
In Table 7, I present the main results of the nested logit model. For comparison, I show
the three sampling strategies: (1) closest distance to bank branch; (2) banks with branches
within 25 km of the firm’s location; and (3) client structure – banks active in the firm’s
district. For each sampling strategy, I present a base specification with the bank’s market
share and regional concentration, a specification with the bank size and industry special-
ization, as well as a specification that further includes the distance between the firm and
the bank branch. Table A.5 in the Appendix presents results with the full set of variables.
I calculate the average marginal effects after the nested logit using the method pre-
sented in Cameron and Trivedi (2009). I increase the value of an observed alternative
varying variable for non-private banks by one standard deviation. Presented marginal
effects correspond to the mean of the difference in predicted probabilities before and after
the amendment. I present the marginal effects of the alternative varying variables for all
three specifications in Table 8.
I first consider the estimated dissimilarity parameter, which indicates to what extent
the error terms within a nest are correlated. A dissimilarity parameter of unity would
indicate that there is no such correlation, and the nest might be inappropriate. The test
of dissimilarity rejects the hypothesis that the dissimilarity parameter equals unity for
all specifications. The value of the estimated coefficient ρ differs over specifications. In
specifications based on the branch network (1) and (2), ρˆ is smaller for private than for
non-private banks, but for client structure (3), the reverse. The value of the estimated
coefficient ρ increases once I introduce the variable distance to branch in km for the
specifications “closest branch” and “client structure.” This might be driven by the fact
that far away alternatives have a stronger effect. For the specification “closest branch,”
this is the case because a chosen main bank relationship that is far away enters the set of
alternatives. In the specification “client structure,” nationwide banks with few branches
enter the choice set, affecting the mean distance.
All the results of the main explanatory variables presented for the logit model above
remain stable in the nested logit. For the control variables, I find that firm size in terms
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Table 7: Main results (coefficients) – Chosen main-bank relationship (nested logit model)
Sampling Strategy: Closest Branch Branches within 25 km Client Structure
Base Size Distance Base Size Distance Base Size Distance
Dependent Variable:
Main bank (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Alternative varying (β)
Bank market share in district 1.743∗∗ 2.242∗∗∗ 3.573∗∗∗ 2.548∗∗∗ 3.138∗∗∗ 3.184∗∗∗ 5.312∗∗∗ 6.301∗∗∗ 6.483∗∗∗
(0.73) (0.62) (0.63) (0.80) (0.75) (0.76) (0.73) (0.73) (0.71)
Bank regional concentration 0.383∗∗ 0.764∗∗∗ 1.171∗∗∗ 0.01 0.198∗∗ 0.203∗∗ 0.459∗∗∗ 0.863∗∗∗ 0.619∗∗∗
(0.17) (0.23) (0.24) (0.04) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.14) (0.13)
Bank size (ln) 0.367∗∗∗ 0.561∗∗∗ 0.622∗∗∗ 0.641∗∗∗ 0.850∗∗∗ 0.825∗∗∗
(0.14) (0.17) (0.18) (0.18) (0.20) (0.20)
Bank size (ln, sq) −0.018∗∗ −0.030∗∗∗ −0.032∗∗∗ −0.033∗∗∗ −0.037∗∗∗ −0.036∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Bank industry specialization 4.030∗∗∗ 4.835∗∗∗ 3.915∗∗∗ 4.061∗∗∗ 2.370∗∗∗ 3.940∗∗∗
(1.26) (1.26) (1.07) (1.11) (0.48) (0.71)
Distance to bank branch in km 0.008∗∗∗ 0.000 −0.006∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Individual specific (α)
Criteria:
Industry competence −0.288 −0.27 −0.23 −0.114 −0.087 −0.077 −0.233 −0.176 −0.123
(0.31) (0.31) (0.32) (0.34) (0.34) (0.34) (0.32) (0.33) (0.34)
Support in crises 0.574∗∗∗ 0.569∗∗∗ 0.551∗∗∗ 0.553∗∗∗ 0.540∗∗ 0.539∗∗ 0.549∗∗∗ 0.560∗∗∗ 0.558∗∗∗
(0.19) (0.20) (0.20) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20)
Specialized fin services −0.702∗∗ −0.718∗∗ −0.727∗∗ −0.773∗∗ −0.756∗∗ −0.760∗∗ −0.743∗∗ −0.805∗∗ −0.797∗∗
(0.33) (0.33) (0.34) (0.36) (0.36) (0.36) (0.35) (0.36) (0.36)
Favorable market conditions −0.674∗∗∗ −0.693∗∗∗ −0.629∗∗∗ −0.652∗∗∗ −0.665∗∗∗ −0.665∗∗∗ −0.648∗∗∗ −0.695∗∗∗ −0.716∗∗∗
(0.18) (0.18) (0.19) (0.19) (0.20) (0.20) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19)
Short distance to bank 1.121∗∗∗ 1.126∗∗∗ 1.108∗∗∗ 1.194∗∗∗ 1.193∗∗∗ 1.190∗∗∗ 1.092∗∗∗ 1.073∗∗∗ 1.064∗∗∗
(0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19)
Firm Characteristics:
Personal prior relation 0.630∗∗∗ 0.606∗∗∗ 0.582∗∗∗ 0.705∗∗∗ 0.697∗∗∗ 0.707∗∗∗ 0.637∗∗∗ 0.579∗∗∗ 0.608∗∗∗
(0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.16) (0.17) (0.17)
Talks with multiple Banks −0.313∗ −0.311∗ −0.319∗ −0.327∗ −0.328∗ −0.323∗ −0.289 −0.284 −0.264
(0.17) (0.17) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18)
Bank loan/service denied 0.121 0.129 0.106 0.17 0.188 0.192 0.181 0.21 0.206
(0.26) (0.26) (0.26) (0.28) (0.28) (0.28) (0.26) (0.27) (0.27)
No. of bank relations 0.084 0.004 −0.063 0.099 0.036 0.038 0.116 −0.004 0.043
(0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.25) (0.26) (0.26) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25)
Demand for bank finance 0.822∗∗∗ 0.799∗∗∗ 0.759∗∗∗ 0.782∗∗∗ 0.771∗∗∗ 0.773∗∗∗ 0.882∗∗∗ 0.912∗∗∗ 0.928∗∗∗
(0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20)
No demand gov support −0.366∗∗ −0.375∗∗ −0.399∗∗ −0.456∗∗ −0.471∗∗ −0.477∗∗ −0.379∗∗ −0.382∗∗ −0.375∗∗
(0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19)
Firm controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regional controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry and year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
ρ Non-private banks 0.350∗∗ 0.547∗∗∗ 0.788∗∗∗ 0.276∗∗∗ 0.411∗∗∗ 0.422∗∗∗ 0.332∗∗∗ 0.537∗∗∗ 0.592∗∗∗
(0.15) (0.16) (0.15) (0.09) (0.10) (0.10) (0.05) (0.07) (0.07)
ρ Private banks 0.250∗∗ 0.349∗∗∗ 0.450∗∗∗ 0.237∗∗∗ 0.367∗∗∗ 0.392∗∗∗ 0.420∗∗∗ 0.638∗∗∗ 0.911∗∗∗
(0.11) (0.11) (0.10) (0.08) (0.10) (0.10) (0.07) (0.09) (0.13)
LR Chi2 316 296 286 320 303 297 298 278 257
Observations 13,992 13,992 13,992 39,720 39,720 39,451 38,998 38,998 38,998
Cases 1,272 1,272 1,272 1,182 1,182 1,176 1,273 1,273 1,273
Alternatives per cases:
Minimum 11 11 11 4 4 4 19 19 19
Average 11 11 11 33.6 33.6 33.5 30.6 30.6 30.6
Maximum 11 11 11 136 136 136 65 65 65
Note: Standard errors are presented in parentheses. *,**, and *** denote significance level on the 10, 5, and 1% levels, respectively.
Source: ZEW Bank Panel, KfW/ZEW Start-up Panel, and MUP (ZEW) 2012, author’s own calculations.
Table 8: Main results (marginal effects) – Chosen main-bank relationship (nested logit
model)
Sampling Strategy Closest Branch Branch within 25km Client Structure
Bank size public 0.018263 0.006797 0.009460
private −0.015219 −0.015867 −0.010071
Bank market share public 0.081273 0.015848 0.044148
private −0.067727 −0.036997 −0.046999
Bank regional public 0.026846 −0.000195 −0.000295
concentration private 0.000687 0.000456 0.000314
Bank industry share public 0.018263 0.006797 0.009460
private −0.015219 −0.015867 −0.010071
Distance to bank public 0.000203 −0.000002 −0.000044
private −0.000169 0.000006 0.000047
Note: This table presents the results of the marginal effect of bank individual specific variables after the Nested Logit model.
Marginal effects are estimated as the mean of the difference in predicted probability after an increase of each variable for private
banks by one standard deviation.
Source: ZEW Bank Panel, KfW/ZEW Start-up Panel, and MUP (ZEW) 2012, author’s own calculations.
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of the number of employees is positive and significant. This finding suggests that larger
firms are more likely to choose a non-private bank. The finding on firm size of the logit
version was similar but not robust.
I now consider the alternative varying variables. I find an inverse U–shaped relationship
of bank size with a firm’s main bank choice, with a positive effect on bank size and a
negative effect on the squared term of bank size. The results on bank size suggest that
firms choose a bank of a sufficiently large size whereas the bank should not be too large.
On the one hand, larger banks are more hierarchically structured (Berger and Black,
2011). In more hierarchic institutions it becomes harder to pass soft information up the
hierarchy. On the other hand, banks that are too small might have difficulties in building
the competence required by entrepreneurs. Growth oriented entrepreneurs might also
take into consideration that a small bank’s lending policy will be limited by bank capital
requirements.
The bank’s market share in the firm’s district has a positive effect on the entrepreneur’s
main bank choice. For the client structure specification, a marginal increase of market
share for non-private banks increases the probability that a bank of this type is chosen by
4.4 percentage points, whereas it decreases the probability that a private bank is chosen
by 4.7 percentage points. Banks with a high market share in the firms region have detailed
local knowledge. Those banks are more capable of assessing a firm’s riskiness and market
chances, especially for firms with a local market orientation. Those banks can also use
their local knowledge to assess the entrepreneur’s trustworthiness.
The probability of being chosen for a main bank relationship increases with the bank’s
regional concentration. Regional concentration can also be interpreted as a measure of
a bank’s hierarchic structure, similar to bank size. The more regionally concentrated is
the bank, the shorter is the distance between the branch and the headquarters. The bank
staff might thus be more closely related, and find it easier to share information. The
bank’s policy in general might be more regional focused. The marginal effect of bank’s
regional concentration is rather small. In the specification for client structure, a marginal
increase in a non-private bank’s concentration increases the probability that a private bank
is chosen by 0.003 percentage points and decreases the probability that a non-private bank
is chosen by 0.003 percentage points.
Although bank competence in the firm’s industry is not an important criterion when
choosing a banking group, it influences the selection of a particular bank. The results on
alternative specific variables reveal that a bank’s likelihood of being chosen increases with
the share of the firm’s industry within the bank’s portfolio. The results suggest that firms
do not relate industry competence with a banking group. From a firm’s perspective, bank
industry competence could ease the firm’s access to bank finance, since the bank is more
capable of evaluating the firm’s project. The economic effect of an increase of industry
competence for non-private banks on the probability of choosing a private vs. non-private
bank is quite small.
In specifications (3), (6), and (9), I introduced the distance between the firm’s location
and the bank branch as a further control variable. The sign of the estimated coefficient
in the sampling strategy “closest bank branch” is positive. This effect is driven by the
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sampling strategy, because banks were replaced if the bank with a higher distance did
not belong to the original set of alternatives. This sampling effect is less severe for the
strategy “branches within 25 km” and non–existent in the strategy “bank client structure.”
In both, the coefficient is negative. As travel costs increase for the entrepreneur and the
banker, who potentially considers on–site visits, the bank is less likely to be chosen. This
is consistent with the finding for the individual specific variables, that closeness to the
bank is an important criterion for choosing a non-private bank. But the effect of actual
distance to the chosen bank is quite small. As the distance of a non-private bank increases
by 1 km, the probability that such a bank is chosen reduces by 0.005 percentage points
for the “client structure” sampling strategy. Given that most chosen banks are within
25 km, distance is not economically relevant. There are two potential explanations for
this. First, Petersen and Rajan (2002) argue that distance might become less important
due to improved lending technologies. They state that public information increases also
for small firms and banks need less direct contact. This is not the case for the firms
under observation. Most firms are proprietorship and do not need to publish financial
statements; and their credit ratings are published only as the firms get older. Second, and
more likely, bank intensity is relatively high in Germany. Firms have many alternative
bank branches within a short distance from the firm’s location. Therefore, differences in
transaction costs might not be severe.
6 Discussion
In this section I discuss further aspects that might a influence firm’s selection of a main
bank. The chosen nested logit model specification should closely reflect the entrepreneur’s
decision making process. In the following, I discuss alternative decision trees. In Table 9
I present a subsample analysis for high-tech industries, personal bank relationships prior
to the start of the business, and talks with multiple banks, in general supporting the
decision tree used in the main model presented above. It is often argued that banks are
less capable of evaluating high-tech industries than traditional industries, and therefore
high-tech firms face more difficulties seeking bank finance (Colombo and Grilli (2007);
Brown et al. (2012)). Due to these differences, the importance of the selection criteria
might differ between firms in traditional and in high-tech industries. I split the sample
according to these two industry types and present the coefficients after a logit model in
column (1) for traditional industries and (2) for high-tech industries in Table 9. The
results suggests that the criteria are not important for high-tech industries.
An alternative tree structure could be that firms first decide whether to stay with the
bank with which they already have a personal relationship. If not, they might choose
a bank according to the decision tree presented above. The descriptive statistics reveal
that approximately two–thirds of all firms use their personal relationship for their firm
as well. But these groups do not differ with respect to other choice variables, such as a
firm’s seeking bank finance or talking to multiple banks. In columns (3) and (4) of Table
9, I present a subsample analysis with respect to prior personal bank relationship. The
results suggest that there are no big differences in the significance and magnitude of the
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Table 9: Results of subsample analyses – Chosen main-bank type
Logit Nested Logit
Client Structure
Specification: Hightech Prior relations Bank talk Bank talk
No Yes No Yes Single Multiple Single Multiple
Dependent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Main Bank
Bank market share in district 8.225∗∗∗ 6.259∗∗∗
(1.32) (0.94)
Banking market concentra-
tion
0.786∗∗∗ 0.599∗∗∗
(0.22) (0.19)
Bank size (ln) 0.867∗∗ 0.933∗∗∗
(0.34) (0.30)
Bank size (ln, sq) −0.037∗ −0.042∗∗
(0.02) (0.02)
Bank industry specialization 3.785∗∗∗ 4.650∗∗∗
(1.03) (1.12)
Distance to bank branch in
km
−0.004∗∗∗ −0.009∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00)
Non-Private Bank
Personal prior relation 0.743∗∗ 0.393 0.459 0.754∗∗∗ 0.376 0.780∗∗∗
(0.24) (0.24) (0.27) (0.22) (0.27) (0.23)
Demand for bank finance 0.720∗∗ 0.873∗∗ 1.157∗∗∗ 0.636∗ 0.833∗∗ 0.847∗∗∗ 0.902∗∗∗ 0.998∗∗∗
(0.27) (0.29) (0.31) (0.27) (0.31) (0.26) (0.34) (0.27)
Talks with multiple Banks −0.352 −0.494∗ −0.605∗ −0.272
(0.26) (0.25) (0.29) (0.23)
Criteria: Industry compe-
tence
−0.361 −0.54 −0.11 −0.821 0.451 −0.703 0.646 −0.35
(0.39) (0.57) (0.46) (0.45) (0.62) (0.38) (0.69) (0.42)
Criteria: Support in crises 0.855∗∗ 0.46 0.739∗ 0.636∗ 0.363 0.683∗∗ 0.313 0.678∗∗
(0.29) (0.28) (0.32) (0.26) (0.32) (0.25) (0.35) (0.27)
Criteria: Specialized fin ser-
vices
−0.499 −1.029 −0.668 −0.747 0.03 −1.055∗∗ −0.759 −1.080∗∗
(0.43) (0.57) (0.52) (0.46) (0.73) (0.41) (0.77) (0.44)
Criteria: Favorable market
conditions
−0.996∗∗∗ −0.415 −0.697∗ −0.804∗∗ −0.748∗ −0.688∗∗ −0.728∗∗ −0.740∗∗∗
(0.27) (0.27) (0.28) (0.26) (0.32) (0.24) (0.34) (0.26)
Criteria: Short distance to
bank
0.979∗∗∗ 1.441∗∗∗ 1.212∗∗∗ 1.175∗∗∗ 1.476∗∗∗ 1.015∗∗∗ 1.368∗∗∗ 1.031∗∗∗
(0.27) (0.27) (0.29) (0.25) (0.30) (0.24) (0.33) (0.26)
Market Exit Prob (3 years) 0.063 −2.376 −0.669 −1.082 2.207 −3.682 3.928 −0.585
(2.60) (2.64) (2.76) (2.54) (2.85) (2.49) (2.65) (2.23)
No. of bank relations 0.43 −0.174 0.469 −0.113 −0.113 0.052 −0.608 0.269
(0.36) (0.36) (0.43) (0.32) (0.41) (0.33) (0.46) (0.33)
Bank loan/service denied 0.115 0.29 −0.056 0.779 0.172 0.331
(0.34) (0.41) (0.35) (0.44) (0.27) (0.28)
No demand gov support −0.45 −0.369 −0.682∗ −0.219 −0.477 −0.381 −0.417 −0.403
(0.28) (0.24) (0.30) (0.24) (0.27) (0.25) (0.30) (0.27)
Demand for external equity −0.178 −0.665 −1.242∗ −0.044 −0.272 −0.539 0.175 −0.658
(0.54) (0.45) (0.54) (0.47) (0.53) (0.45) (0.58) (0.48)
Export −0.622 0.598 −0.276 0.34 −0.358 0.115 −0.379 0.218
(0.35) (0.36) (0.36) (0.36) (0.42) (0.32) (0.46) (0.34)
Sales −0.076 −0.018 −0.728 0.093 0.512 −0.546 0.281 −0.056
(0.53) (0.37) (0.54) (0.37) (0.43) (0.44) (0.44) (0.40)
Proprietorship −0.444 −0.431 0.064 −0.814∗∗ −0.273 −0.515 −0.413 −0.098
(0.34) (0.32) (0.37) (0.31) (0.35) (0.32) (0.35) (0.31)
Firm size (employees) 0.083 0.044 0.078 0.037 0.022 0.134∗ 0.035 0.123∗∗
(0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Management team 0.111 0.225 0.135 0.126 0.398 −0.131 0.45 −0.141
(0.28) (0.26) (0.31) (0.25) (0.29) (0.26) (0.31) (0.27)
Entrepreneurial record −0.690∗ 0.035 −0.403 −0.289 −0.334 −0.237 −0.14 −0.215
(0.29) (0.26) (0.32) (0.26) (0.29) (0.26) (0.32) (0.28)
University degree −0.013 −0.043 0.115 −0.169 −0.445 0.27 −0.427 0.462
(0.31) (0.28) (0.34) (0.27) (0.31) (0.28) (0.34) (0.29)
Master craftsman 0.172 0.408 −0.263 0.724 0.367 0.22 0.462 0.423
(0.33) (0.41) (0.39) (0.39) (0.44) (0.33) (0.47) (0.34)
Industry and Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regional controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
public tau
Constant 0.614∗∗∗ 0.667∗∗∗
(0.11) (0.11)
private tau
Constant 1.066∗∗∗ 0.957∗∗∗
(0.23) (0.18)
Constant 1.92 0.479 1.095 1.596 −0.272 1.475
(1.02) (0.93) (1.11) (0.82) (1.04) (0.90)
Observations 759 514 450 823 579 694 17,715 21,283
LR Chi2 120 104 116 156 116 152 106 147
log likelihood -250.28 -254.85 -201.02 -290.94 -216.31 -284.86 -940.26 -1,282.49
Note: In this table I present the results of subsample analysis. In column (1) only lowtech and in column (2) only
hightech firms are sampled. In column (3) firms are sampled where entrepreneurs did not have a personal relationship
with the selected bank prior the start of the business and in column (4) if the entrepreneur did have such a relationship.
Firms in columns (5) and (7) are sampled if the firm did not have talks to multiple banks. In columns (6) and (8) only
firms are sampled if the firm talked to multiple banks. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. *,**, and ***
denote significance level on the 10, 5, and 1% levels, respectively.
Source: ZEW Bank Panel, KfW/ZEW Start-up Panel, and MUP (ZEW) 2012, author’s own calculations.
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coefficients.
Firms that use the bank with prior personal relationships might talk with multiple
other banks in order to reduce the financing costs. In a further specification, I find
evidence for such a strategy. I used an interaction term of talks to multiple banks and the
criterion of “favorable market conditions”. In this specification both indicator variables
were insignificant whereas the interaction term becomes significant.
This finding suggests that firms first decide whether they approach a single bank or
talk to multiple banks. Due to the transaction costs for bank talks, one can expect that
firms need specific criteria to be fulfilled in order to choose a main bank relationship. In
columns (5) to (8) of Table 9, I present the subsample analysis for the logit and nested logit
model. For firms that talked with only a single bank, the criteria “short distance,” “fa-
vorable market conditions,” and “demand for bank finance” are also significant. For firms
that talked to multiple number of banks, “support in financial distress” and s“specialized
financial services” are significant, in addition. This is in line with the expectation that
those firms that talk to multiple banks are more likely to have certain criteria that need
to be fulfilled. The signs of the coefficients are also in line with expectations regarding
relationship/transaction-orientation.
The analysis is based on the assumption that the firm chooses a bank, whereas banks
remain passive. This might not be the case and banks might play a more active role.
Banks can use different marketing and selection strategies to attract new customers. They
might also differ in their screening methods. Next to scoring models, banks could, e.g.,
use behavioral models that use information on entrepreneur’s personal cash management.
The model used by a particular bank is unknown. However, such behavioral models
would require that data from previous personal relationships are available. Throughout
the empirical models, I control for previous personal bank relationships. Another aspect
of a more active role of banks is that banks can deny a relationship. This need not happen
offensively, and a bank could deny single financial services or offer them only at a high
cost. The entrepreneurs were asked whether a bank denied a loan, current account, or
other financial services. I use this information to control for whether a firm’s choice set
was restricted. Only a small fraction of firms were denied by any bank. Only a couple
of firms reported not having a main bank relationship. The results suggest that in most
cases, the main bank relationship is selected by the firm.
During the process of starting a business, banks give advice to entrepreneurs. If the
advice depends on the banking group, it could lead to potential endogeneity difficulties.
I discuss the two variables most prone to endogeneity problems: not demanding gov-
ernmental support, and the firm’s legal form. Banks are involved in many schemes of
public funding in Germany. Private banks (24%) less frequently offer a combination of
own and publicly supported funding by themselves, than do Sparkassen and cooperative
banks (40% and 42%; Source: KfW/ZEW Start-up Panel). However, the endogeneity
problems might not be severe, for two reasons. First, information about public subsidies
is easily accessible on the internet. Second, most entrepreneurs ask chambers of commerce
for general advice before starting a business. Any firm, including a bank, is a mandatory
member of the chamber of commerce. Therefore, chambers of commerce do not have in-
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centives to provide different information about governmental subsidies and types of main
bank relationships. Formally, the entrepreneur’s personal financial liability depends on
the firm’s legal form. Banks use different contracts to secure credit provided to the firm
by the entrepreneur’s personal wealth if the firm is a limited liability. The techniques do
not differ between bank types and there is no reason to believe that the advice in favor of
or against a legal form depend on the bank type.
7 Conclusion
Financing sources differ in their liquidation policies. The theoretical literature predicts
that firms choose financing sources according their own risk. Sparkassen and cooperative
banks have a mandate or mission statement to support troubled but viable firms. Private
banks have no restrictions on their lending strategy. These banks have incentives to offer
transaction oriented banking and attract low risk firms. Employing a rich data set on newly
established firms, I test whether firms chose their main bank relationship according to their
risk. I find that firms for which bank support in financially difficult times is of utmost
importance are more likely to choose a Sparkasse or cooperative bank. Entrepreneurs who
consider previous personal relationships as important for the firm–bank relationship are
more likely to “stay” with a non-private bank. Firms seeking bank finance in their initial
year are also more likely to choose a non-private bank. Cost sensitive firms, however, are
more likely to choose a private bank. Firms not asking for governmental subsidies might
signal their low risk to private banks. But I did not find significant differences in the
predicted default probability among bank types.
The findings suggest that private banks might be expected to be tougher in renegoti-
ation. But if a self selection strategy by private banks exist, it might not work out well.
Such a strategy would be successful if private banks attract clients with a low risk of
default. An entrepreneur’s risk assessment might not be correlated with the “objective”
risk. The risk portfolio observed is that of all clients, and need not reflect the average
risk of a banks’ loan portfolio. However, because switching rates are low in general, banks
grant loans mostly within their existing portfolio. The results further indicate that private
banks have less rent seeking potential. Private banks attract cost sensitive clients that are
probably more likely to switch the bank relationship.
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A Appendix
Table A.1: Market exit - Descriptive statistics and probit results
Variable Descriptive Statistics Market Exit
N Mean Min Max SD Coefficient S.E.
Firm size and Team
No. of employees (full time equivalent) 5795 1.27 0.00 282.5 6.139 0.01 (0.01)
No. of team members 5.795 1.41 1 12 0.818 0.00 0.00
Age of oldest team member 5.795 39.60 16 93 9.870 -0.015 (0.03)
Age of oldest team member (sq.) 5.795 1665.65 256 8649 828.716 0.00 (0.00)
Material expenses 5.795 0.63 0.00 1 0.483 0.00 (0.00)
Female Entrepreneur (at least one) 5.795 0.19 0.00 1 0.389 -0.013 (0.11)
Entrepreneur was unemployed prior
foundation
5.795 0.17 0.00 1 0.375 0.00 (0.00)
No. Of team members with en-
trepreneurial experience
5.795 0.20 0.00 3 0.568 0.00 (0.00)
No. of patents granted prior founda-
tion
5.795 0.20 0.00 180 4.175 0.002 (0.01)
craft 5.795 0.27 0.00 1 0.444 -0.298** (0.13)
Limited liability 5.795 0.30 0.00 1 0.459 -0.704*** (0.12)
Motivation
Motivation - Implementation of a busi-
ness idea*
5.795 0.33 0.00 1 0.471 0.114 (0.10)
Motivation - Avoiding a situation of
unemployment*
5.795 0.18 0.00 1 0.383 0.252** (0.12)
Motivation - Others* 5.795 0.03 0.00 1 0.183 0.007 (0.23)
Education and Experience
Industry experience (years) 5.795 13.56 1 54 9.419 0.00 (0.00)
Industry experience (years, sq.) 5.795 272.54 1 2916 340.463 0.00 (0.00)
Qualification in business 5.795 0.26 0.00 1 0.438 0.00 (0.00)
Qualification in business and technol-
ogy
5.795 0.06 0.00 1 0.244 0.00 (0.00)
Qualification in technology 5.795 0.61 0.00 1 0.487 0.00 (0.00)
Portfolio Entrepreneur 5.795 0.05 0.00 1 0.213 0.00 (0.00)
Restarter 5.795 0.04 0.00 1 0.186 0.00 (0.00)
Serial Entrepreneur 5.795 0.02 0.00 1 0.146 0.00 (0.00)
no qualification 5.795 0.03 0.00 1 0.176 0.387 (0.24)
Master Craftsman 5.795 0.26 0.00 1 0.437 0.135 (0.12)
University degree 5.795 0.39 0.00 1 0.488 0.153 (0.11)
Regional and Industry character-
istics
East Germany 5.795 0.18 0.00 1 0.385 0.00 (0.00)
Metropolitan areas and central cities 5.795 0.22 0.00 1 0.414 0.00 (0.00)
Urban areas 5.795 0.44 0.00 1 0.496 -0.008 (0.17)
Urban hinterland 5.795 0.13 0.00 1 0.337 0.082 (0.19)
Rural areas 5.795 0.14 0.00 1 0.343 -0.318 (0.20)
Firm age at panel entry 1 year 5.795 0.39 0.00 1 0.487 -0.341*** (0.10)
Firm age at panel entry 2 years 5.795 0.34 0.00 1 0.474 -1.452*** (0.13)
Cutting edge technology 5.795 0.06 0.00 1 0.243 -0.39 (0.27)
High-technology 5.795 0.04 0.00 1 0.206 0.603*** (0.22)
Software 5.795 0.08 0.00 1 0.273 0.424** (0.17)
Non-tech manufacturing 5.795 0.12 0.00 1 0.328 0.119 (0.17)
Knowledge intensive services 5.795 0.07 0.00 1 0.257 -0.029 (0.19)
Industry related services 5.795 0.05 0.00 1 0.216 0.323 (0.20)
Conusmer related services 5.795 0.12 0.00 1 0.328 0.071 (0.16)
Construction 5.795 0.11 0.00 1 0.317 0.255 (0.18)
Trade 5.795 0.13 0.00 1 0.341 0.226 (0.15)
Constant -0.948 (0.61)
log likelihood -1992.93
A APPENDIX 34
Table A.1: Market exit - Descriptive statistics and probit results
Variable Descriptive Statistics Market Exit
N Mean Min Max SD Coefficient S.E.
LR Chi2 301
Source: KfW/ZEW Start-up Panel and MUP (ZEW) 2012, author’s own calculations.
Figure A1: Receiver Operator Characteristics of predicted market exit probability
Note: Comparison of observed market exit with predicted probability of market exit based on a probit regression of newly established
firms in Germany using the KfW/ZEW Start-up Panel. Predicted probability that firms established in the years 2005 to 2007 exit
the market within 3 years.
Source: KfW/ZEW Start-up Panel and MUP (ZEW) 2012, author’s own calculation.
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Table A.2: Descriptive statistics for logit model
Variable Mean SD Min Max Definition Source
Prior personal bank relation 0.64 0.48 0 1 1 if at least one team member had private or
business relation with the firms main bank
SuP
Multiple bank talks 0.54 0.50 0 1 1 if firm had multiple bank talks SuP
Bank loan/service denied 0.13 0.34 0 1 1 if a bank denied account keeping, loans,
provision of financial services
SuP
Criteria: Competence 0.10 0.29 0 1 1 if industry competence were considered as
of utmost important for main bank selection
SuP
Criteria: Support in Crisis 0.36 0.48 0 1 1 if banks support in case of firm financial
distress were considered as of utmost impor-
tant for main bank selection.
SuP
Criteria: Specialized finan-
cial services
0.06 0.24 0 1 1 if spezialiszed financial services were con-
sidered as of utmost important for main bank
selection.
SuP
Criteria: Favorable market
conditions
0.29 0.46 0 1 1 if favorable market conditions were consid-
ered as vof utmost important for main bank
selection
SuP
Criteria: Short distance to
bank
0.43 0.50 0 1 1 if closeness to bank were considered as of
utmost important for main bank selection
SuP
Market Exit Prob (3 years) 0.16 0.07 0.02 0.44 Predicted probability of market exit within
3 years
SuP/MUP
No. of bank relations 1.00 0.36 0 3 No of bank relations MUP
Demand for bank finance 0.53 0.50 0 1 1 if firm either used and/or reported difficul-
ties with bank finance
SuP
No demand for gov support 0.37 0.48 0 1 1 if firm either used and/or reported difficul-
ties with governmental support
SuP
Demand for external equity 0.05 0.23 0 1 1 if firm either used and/or reported difficul-
ties with external equity
SuP
Exporting 0.12 0.32 0 1 1 if firm sold products on foreign markets in
its initial year
SuP
Sales 0.90 0.29 0 1 1 if firm with sales in intial year SuP
Expected sales decline 0.15 0.35 0 1 1 if interview partner expected decline in
sales for the second year
SuP
Proprietorship 0.43 0.50 0 1 1 if firm has a legal form of a limited liability MUP
Firm size (employees) 2.74 6.64 1 242 Number of full-time equivalent employees in-
cluding team members at startup
SuP
Management team 0.32 0.47 0 1 1 if firm was founded by a team. SuP
Entrepreneurial record 0.17 0.38 0 1 1 if entrepreneur was a owner-manager of
firms prior start-up of the observed firm
SuP
University degree 0.42 0.49 0 1 1 if at least one team member holds a uni-
versity degree as highest level of education
SuP
Master craftsman 0.25 0.43 0 1 1 if at least one team member holds a cer-
tificate of master craftsman
SuP
Motivation: business idea 0.35 0.48 0 1 1 if implementation of a business idea was
the main motivation of start-up
SuP
Motivation: higher expected
salary
0.06 0.25 0 1 1 if implementation of a higher salary was
the main motivation of start-up
SuP
Bank intensity (firm) 5.236 1.995 1.706 14.12 No of banks per 1,000 firms active in the dis-
trict
MUP/BP
Bank intensity (employees) 0.52 0.30 0.0 2.0 No. Of banks per 1,000 people employed in
the district
MUP/BP
Local banking market com-
petition (district)
0.01 0.27 0.0 28.6 No of firms switched their main bank rela-
tion in proportion to the number of firms;
per district
MUP/BP
Metropolises 0.08 0.26 0 1 District of cities ≥ 2,500 inhabitants/km MUP/BBR
Major city 0.22 0.41 0 1 District of cities ≥ 100,000 inhabitants MUP/BBR
Hinterland 0.12 0.33 0 1 Districts in urban area with population den-
sity of < 150 inhabitants/km
MUP/BBR
Urban area 0.45 0.50 0 1 Districts in urban area with population den-
sity of ≥ 150 inhabitants/km
MUP/BBR
Rural area 0.14 0.34 0 1 Districts in rural areas MUP/BBR
Year 2009 0.34 0.48 0 1 1 if Year of foundation is 2009 SuP
Year 2010 0.35 0.48 0 1 1 if Year of foundation is 2010 SuP
Year 2011 0.31 0.46 0 1 1 if Year of foundation is 2011 SuP
Cutting edge technology 0.08 0.27 0 1 1 if industry is Cutting edge technology SuP
High-tech manufacturing 0.07 0.26 0 1 1 if industry is High-technology SuP
Software 0.07 0.25 0 1 1 if industry is Software SuP
Technology intensive services 0.21 0.41 0 1 1 if industry is technology intensive services SuP
Low-tech manufacturing 0.11 0.32 0 1 1 if industry is Low-tech manufacturing SuP
Knowledge intensive services 0.05 0.23 0 1 1 if industry is Knowledge intensive services SuP
Business related services 0.06 0.24 0 1 1 if industry is Other business related ser-
vices
SuP
Consumer related services 0.09 0.28 0 1 1 if industry is Consumer orientierted ser-
vices
SuP
Construction 0.11 0.32 0 1 1 if industry is Construction SuP
Trade 0.14 0.35 0 1 1 if industry is Trade SuP
Definition of sources: SuP - KfW/ZEW Start-up Panel; MUP - Mannheim Enterprise Panel; BP - ZEW Bank Panel; BBR -
Federal office for building and regional planing
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Table A.3: Characteristics of chosen main bank – Sample distribution
Bank type Min P25 P50 P75 P90 Max
Bank size (total)
Public Banks 2 17 36 71 143 601
Cooperative Banks 0 4 8 15 24 160
Private Banks 0 1,439 3,273 4,747 4,957 4,957
Bank market share in district
Public Banks 0.00 0.13 0.27 0.39 0.49 0.71
Cooperative Banks 0.00 0.02 0.07 0.11 0.16 0.30
Private Banks 0.00 0.04 0.13 0.21 0.27 0.43
Bank regional concentration
Public Banks 0.10 0.42 0.72 0.83 0.89 0.95
Cooperative Banks 0.01 0.41 0.56 0.78 0.86 0.96
Private Banks 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.41
Bank industry specialization
Public Banks 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.09 0.40
Cooperative Banks 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.07 0.12 0.50
Private Banks 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.07 0.28
Distance to bank branch in km
Public Banks 0 1 3 8 18 610
Cooperative Banks 0 1 4 11 23 571
Private Banks 0 2 6 19 150 740
Distance to bank headquarter in km
Public Banks 0 3 9 17 29 553
Cooperative Banks 0 4 10 19 32 574
Private Banks 0 151 243 379 444 757
Source: KfW/ZEW Start-up Panel and MUP (ZEW) 2012, author’s own
calculations.
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Table A.4: Descriptive statistics of the set of alternatives by sampling strategy
Closest Branch Banks within 25 km Client Structure
No. of observations 13,992 39,451 38,998
Min Max Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Bank market share 0.000 0.697 0.069 0.108 0.027 0.072 0.020 0.063
Bank regional concentra-
tion
0.013 1 0.251 0.301 0.450 0.322 0.259 0.293
Bank size 0.000 11.271 7.263 1.731 6.414 1.886 6.403 1.492
Bank industry share 0 1 0.042 0.051 0.041 0.055 0.037 0.056
Distance to bank branch 0 757 16.0 28.3 32.7 73.1 102.2 130.1
Multiple bank talks 0 1 0.545 0.498 0.533 0.499 0.546 0.498
Prior personal bank rela-
tion
0 1 0.647 0.478 0.657 0.475 0.641 0.480
Bank loan/service denied 0 1 0.135 0.342 0.130 0.337 0.139 0.346
Criteria: Competence 0 1 0.091 0.288 0.074 0.262 0.087 0.282
Criteria: Support in Crisis 0 1 0.356 0.479 0.358 0.479 0.348 0.476
Criteria: Specialized finan-
cial services
0 1 0.056 0.230 0.055 0.227 0.057 0.231
Criteria: Favorable market
conditions
0 1 0.291 0.454 0.278 0.448 0.285 0.451
Criteria: Short distance to
bank
0 1 0.439 0.496 0.410 0.492 0.428 0.495
Sales 0 1 0.921 0.269 0.924 0.266 0.922 0.269
Demand for bank finance 0 1 0.527 0.499 0.527 0.499 0.518 0.500
No demand for gov support 0 1 0.355 0.479 0.365 0.481 0.362 0.481
Demand for external eq-
uity
0 1 0.054 0.227 0.059 0.236 0.055 0.227
Exporting 0 1 0.124 0.330 0.125 0.330 0.128 0.335
Market Exit Prob (3 years) 0.048 0.444 0.175 0.065 0.170 0.063 0.175 0.065
No. of bank relations 0 3 1.007 0.351 0.998 0.344 1.004 0.345
Proprietorship 0 1 0.425 0.494 0.444 0.497 0.431 0.495
Firm size (employees) 1 242 2.751 7.462 2.714 6.914 2.663 6.783
Management team 0 1 0.312 0.463 0.328 0.470 0.316 0.465
Entrepreneurial record 0 1 0.219 0.413 0.218 0.413 0.219 0.413
University degree 0 1 0.414 0.493 0.444 0.497 0.430 0.495
Master craftsman 0 1 0.248 0.432 0.244 0.430 0.240 0.427
Year 2009 0 1 0.270 0.444 0.251 0.433 0.263 0.440
Year 2010 0 1 0.333 0.471 0.320 0.466 0.330 0.470
Metropolises 0 1 0.072 0.259 0.053 0.224 0.116 0.321
Major city 0 1 0.211 0.408 0.290 0.454 0.214 0.410
Urban area 0 1 0.126 0.332 0.083 0.276 0.102 0.303
Rural area 0 1 0.131 0.338 0.080 0.272 0.105 0.307
Bank intensity (employees) 0.012 1.977 0.512 0.298 0.477 0.289 0.482 0.299
Local banking market com-
petition (district)
0.002 0.022 0.007 0.003 0.007 0.003 0.007 0.003
Cutting edge technology 0 1 0.059 0.236 0.073 0.260 0.061 0.239
High-tech manufacturing 0 1 0.046 0.209 0.040 0.195 0.044 0.204
Software 0 1 0.079 0.269 0.075 0.264 0.080 0.271
Low-tech manufacturing 0 1 0.110 0.313 0.113 0.317 0.107 0.309
Knowledge intensive ser-
vices
0 1 0.053 0.225 0.063 0.243 0.060 0.238
Business related services 0 1 0.064 0.244 0.060 0.238 0.064 0.244
Consumer related services 0 1 0.090 0.286 0.082 0.275 0.092 0.289
Construction 0 1 0.121 0.326 0.107 0.309 0.116 0.320
Trade 0 1 0.158 0.365 0.146 0.353 0.152 0.359
Source: KfW/ZEW Start-up Panel and MUP (ZEW) 2012, author’s own calculations.
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Table A.5: Results of control variables – chosen main-bank relationship (nested logit
model)
Sampling: Branch network Sampling: Client Structure
Base Bank Char Distance Base Bank Char Distance
risk and risk aversion risk and risk and risk aversion risk and
risk aversion risk aversion risk aversion risk aversion risk aversion
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Further control variables
Demand for external equity -0.551** -0.429 -0.513* -0.611** -0.489* -0.592**
(0.28) (0.28) (0.29) (0.29) (0.28) (0.29)
Competence important 0.065 0.199 0.116 0.04 0.214 0.075
(0.28) (0.28) (0.29) (0.28) (0.28) (0.29)
Sales 0.229 0.065 0.064 0.293 0.231 0.382*
(0.22) (0.21) (0.23) (0.22) (0.21) (0.22)
Proprietorship -0.225 -0.321** -0.374** -0.143 -0.263 -0.11
(0.18) (0.16) (0.19) (0.18) (0.16) (0.19)
Firm size (employees) 0.053 0.037 0.048 0.058* 0.044 0.058*
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Management team 0.094 0.105 0.081 0.075 0.066 0.067
(0.16) (0.16) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17)
Entrepreneurial record -0.195 -0.261 -0.17 -0.183 -0.172 -0.2
(0.17) (0.16) (0.18) (0.17) (0.16) (0.18)
University degree -0.112 -0.147 -0.104 -0.136 -0.148 -0.121
(0.18) (0.17) (0.18) (0.18) (0.17) (0.18)
Master craftsman 0.208 0.192 0.194 0.187 0.163 0.181
(0.21) (0.21) (0.22) (0.22) (0.21) (0.22)
Local banking competition -10.254 -12.668 -8.072 2.579 4.314 11.648
(24.12) (22.70) (24.66) (24.75) (23.09) (25.35)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
jahr2009 0.109 0.109 0.147 0.128 0.136 0.145
(0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18)
jahr2010 0.016 0.016 0.03 0.037 0.038 0.048
(0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17)
Cutting Edge Technology -0.033 -0.033 -0.047 0.105 0.095 0.154
(0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.30) (0.30) (0.30)
High technology 0.315 0.315 0.362 0.412 0.404 0.444
(0.33) (0.33) (0.33) (0.34) (0.34) (0.34)
Software -0.123 -0.123 -0.112 -0.03 -0.029 0.009
(0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.26)
Manufacturing 0.706** 0.706** 0.705** 0.792** 0.777** 0.786**
(0.30) (0.30) (0.30) (0.31) (0.31) (0.31)
Knowledge intensive services 0.276 0.276 0.27 0.192 0.232 0.303
(0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.29)
Business oriented services 0.376 0.376 0.382 0.367 0.358 0.373
(0.32) (0.32) (0.33) (0.33) (0.33) (0.33)
Consumer oriented services 0.253 0.253 0.275 0.28 0.27 0.327
(0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.29)
Construction 0.119 0.119 0.136 0.405 0.304 0.243
(0.30) (0.30) (0.30) (0.30) (0.30) (0.30)
Trade 0.406* 0.406* 0.409* 0.532** 0.491** 0.528**
(0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.25)
Note: This table presents the results of the Nested Logit model. The upper part presents estimated coefficients of the (bank) alter-
native varying variables. The lower part presents the figures of the individual specific variables that does not vary over alternatives.
Previous estimation results suggested to use two nests: Public/cooperative vs. private banks. Private banks is used as base category
in the lower part. Columns (1)-(3) refer to estimation results based on the sampling strategy “Bank branch structure”. Each firm is
assigned the nearest branch of each of the two nearest Sparkassen, cooperative banks and small private banks, as well as the nearest
branch of the four large banks (Deutsche Bank, Commerzbank, Postbank, and HypoVereinsbank). Bank information is replaced with
respect to bank type if the chosen bank is not initially sampled. Columns (4)-(6) refer to estimation results based on the sampling
strategy “Bank client structure”. A bank is assigned as an alternative of a firm if the bank is regional and active in the firms district,
super-regional and active in the firms regional planing area, or national active. Regional (super-regional) banks are considered to be
active in firms district (regional planing area) if the bank has a significant share of costumers (1 / count of districts (regional planing
area)) in the firms district (regional planing area). Bank information is replaced with respect to bank type if the chosen bank is not
initially sampled. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. *,**, and *** denote significance level on the 10, 5, and 1% levels of
significance.
Source: KfW/ZEW Start-up Panel and MUP (ZEW) 2012, author’s own calculations.
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Table A.6: Industry classification used by the KfW/ZEW Start-up Panel
No. Industry NACE Code Rev. 1
high-tech industries
1 cutting-edge technology manufac-
turing
23.30, 24.20, 24.41, 24.61, 29.11, 29.60, 30.02,
31.62, 32.10, 32.20, 33.20, 33.30, 35.30
2 high-technology manufacturing 22.33, 24.11, 24.12-4, 24.17, 24.30, 24.42,
24.62-4, 24.66, 29.12-4, 29.31-2, 29.40, 29.52-
6, 30.01, 31.10, 31.40, 31.50, 32.30, 33.10,
33.40, 34.10, 34.30, 35.20
3 technology-intensive services 64.2, 72 (without 72.2), 73.1, 74.2, 74.3
4 software supply and consultancy 72.2
non-high-tech industries
5 non-high-tech manufacturing 15 37 (without sectors 1 + 2)
6 skill-intensive services (non-
technical consulting services)
73.2, 74.11-4, 74.4
7 other business-oriented services 71.1, 71.2, 71.3, 74.5 74.8 (without 74.84.7),
90, 64.1, 61, 62, 60.3, 63.1, 63.2, 63.4
8 consumer-oriented services 55, 70, 71.4, 92, 93, 80.4, 65-67, 60.1, 60.2,
63.3
9 construction 45
10 wholesale and retail trade (without
trade agents)
50 52 (without 51.1)
Note: Cutting-edge manufacturing technology: manufacturing industries with average R&D expenditure ¿ 8.5% of total sales.
High-technology manufacturing: manufacturing industries with average R&D expenditure 3.5 8.5% of total sales.
Source: Grupp and Legler (2000), classification KfW/ZEW start-up Panel Fryges et al. (2010).
